Computer-mediated group interaction and innovativeness : investigating the effects of communication properties, cognitive style, and idea generation attitudes on innovative thinking processes by Gressgård, Leif Jarle
Computer-mediated Group Interaction and Innovativeness
Investigating the effects of communication properties, cognitive style, and idea
generation attitudes on innovative thinking processes
by
Leif Jarle Gressgård
November 2005
Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Strategy and Management at the Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Dr. Oecon.
- ACknowledgements -
The proficiencies and contributions of several people have been instrumental in the
completion of this project. First, I would like to express my special appreciation to my
committee members, Associate Professor Gunnar E. Christensen and Professor Kjell
Grønhaug at NHH, and Associate Professor Bård Kuvaas at the Norwegian School of
Management. They all provided valuable guidance and enhanced the learning process. I am
especially grateful to Gunnar for his support throughout this thesis effort. His knowledge and
constant vigilance were extremely valuable and appreciated. A special dept of gratitude is also
owed to Kjell for his numerous comments and encouragement.
I am also indebted to a number of people who have contributed in different ways during the
process. The members of the e-markets research group at SNF; Professor Leif B. Methlie,
Associate Professor Herbjørn Nysveen and Associate Professor Helge Thorbjørnsen at NHH,
and Professor Per Egil Pedersen at Agder University College, have all been helpful. I am
especially grateful to Leif for including me in the research group, and letting me work on his
research projects. Very useful research experience has been gained working with him. I have
also very much appreciated the presence of my office neighbour, Herbjørn, who patiently has
coped with frequent disturbances in his daily work for the last four years. He deserves praise
for providing both academic and social support, for being a supreme travel companion, and
not the least for sharing his interesting (though sometimes scaring) perspectives of life with
me. I also want to thank all colleagues and friends at the Department of Strategy and
Management, and especially the members of the Information Management Group.
Finally, I would like to declare my gratefulness to my familyand friends for being around,
and especially for the unconditional support of my parents.
Bergen, November 2005 Leif Jarle Gressgård
ii
- Abstract -
Strong abilities to innovate by use of communication technologies are often appraised as a
source of competitive advantage in the information economy, and research concerning the
facilitating role of technology regarding organizational innovation is therefore required. In
this dissertation the focus is directed at the relationship between electronically mediated
communication and innovative thinking. The impacts of computer-mediated communication
on specific thinking processes in group-based problem solving are addressed, and hypotheses
concerning the effects of different aspects of the communication environment (the degree of
synchronicity, parallelism, and identification) on manifestations of innovative thinking
processes (divergent focus and convergent focus) are proposed. The moderating roles of the
group members' attitudes toward idea generation (preference for ideation and preference for
evaluation) and their cognitive styles (explorative and assimilative) are also discussed and
hypothesized on.
Experiments involving a total of 95 graduate and undergraduate students were conducted in
order to test the hypotheses. The results revealed few overall differences between the chosen
communication properties in their influence on innovative thinking processes. However,
effects of synchronicity on convergent focus were found, indicating that low synchronous
interaction may enhance the evaluative processes in group-based problem solving. Further,
when the subjects' attitudes toward idea generation and cognitive styles were included as
moderators, some interesting findings appeared. Most notable is the important role of
preference for evaluation in low synchronous interaction. It was observed that low
synchronicity positively influences convergent focus for participants with low preferences for
evaluation. It was also found that divergent focus increases with increasing explorative
cognitive styles in interaction with low identification of group members' contributions, while
the opposite relationship was found when the level of identification was high. The most
important practical implications that can be drawn from the study relate to the overall
conclusion that the same collaborative tools (configurations) should not be used in all phases
of the problem solving process. That is, group facilitators have to consider both personal and
technological factors in order to configure the communication environment that best supports
the objectives of the work that is to be carried out.
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Part I
- Introduction -
In the first part of the dissertation, I introduce the issues underlying the importance of the
research focus. Thereafter, the research question I try to answer is put forth, and the expected
contribution of the research is described. The introductory section is ended with an outline
and brief description of the various parts of the dissertation.
1 Introduction
It is becoming widely recognized that the transition to a knowledge society and a global
information economy will be the most important social and economic changes of the next
decade. Characteristics of this economy - international competition, fragmented and
demanding markets, and diverse and rapidly changing technologies - are placing intense
pressure on companies to adopt flexible approaches to development of products and services,
shorten innovation processes (Kessler, 1996), and speed up time to market (Iansiti &
MacCormack, 1997). Superior performance in product/service development and innovation is
therefore believed to be one of the main sources of competitive advantage in the modem
market place.
Another characteristic of the information economy is the growing importance of technology-
based communication and interaction. Qualities of communication media like the Internet
render possible a simultaneous exchange of rich and detailed information among a large
number of people and organizations (Evans & Wurster, 1997), and information technology is
therefore increasingly being used to support collaborative work in a variety of organizational
settings. Software that facilitates computer-mediated communication allows members of
collaborative teams to jointly generate ideas, make decisions, and solve problems. The
available collaborative tools speed communication by providing features such as text chat,
instant messaging, joint document editing, and real-time online collaboration, and "virtual
teamwork" has therefore become a viable form for work in modem organizations (Martins et
al.,2004).
1.1 Researchquestion andpositioning
In this business environment, characterized by a widespread use of electronic communication
facilities and a constant need for innovation, it is not just the information or the technology
per se that commands strategic attention. Rather, the environmental, technological,
organizational, and human conditions that allow for successful utilization of the technology
regarding facilitation of innovation processes are of equal or greater importance. Based on
this acknowledgement, this study will focus on how qualities or properties of electronic
communication media may impact on individuals' innovative thinking in group-based
problem solving, and the following research question will be tried answered:
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Do electronic communication media influence innovative thinking processes? If yes:
How?
Many studies in the computer-mediated communication (CMC) literature focus on differences
between various "communication modes" (e.g. face-to-face and dispersed computer-mediated
interaction), without digging deeper into the underlying qualities of the modes (see e.g.
Fjermestad, 2004 for a review). However, in order to generate new knowledge on desirable
use of ICT in groups, it is important to investigate how the distinctive characteristics of
different CMC settings impact on relevant individual and organizational factors. I will
therefore not adopt a "mode perspective" in this study, but rather put emphasis on variables
that all mediated and non-mediated communication processes can be described and evaluated
by, which will vary in strength depending on the context in which the interaction occurs (e.g.
how electronic interaction tools are configured). There are many theories that have been
developed in this research stream, and accordingly there are many theoretical concepts
describing underlying features of communication modes. Theories like Media Richness
Theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986), Media Synchronicity Theory (Dennis & Valacich, 1999) and
Burgoon et al. 's (2000a; 2000b) interactivity model all make efforts in describing the
constituent parts of mediated communication. Based on existing theoretical contributions, a
part of the dissertation will be devoted to a discussion of properties that can be used to
describe and evaluate mediated communication processes, with a particular focus on
properties I find to be of special importance for individuals in group-based problem solving
processes.
In studies occupied with group-based CMC and Group Support Systems, the outcome factors
are generally efficiency measures (e.g. decision time, number of decision cycles),
effectiveness measures (e.g. decision quality, decision confidence), satisfaction measures (e.g.
participation, influence, confidence), consensus (e.g. decision agreement, commitment), and
usability measures (willingness to work together again, system utilization) (Fjermestad &
Hiltz, 1999). Further, in studies focusing on the relationship between use of ICT in group
interaction and innovation, the dependent (innovation) variables investigated are often
products or artifacts resulting from the group processes. Variables commonly used in this
research domain are for example the number and/or quality of the ideas generated (e.g.
Connolly et al., 1990; Gallupe et al., 1992). Accordingly, little emphasis has been put on how
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communication properties influence the innovation processes which lead to better or more
desirable scores on the outcome variables. This research applies such a process perspective,
and focuses on innovative thinking processes for each individual in a group-based problem
solving situation. Moreover, literature focusing on problem solving in groups has shown that
individual factors like cognitive style and attitudes toward idea generation may account for
variability in both processes and outcomes of problem solving sessions, and these variables
are therefore included as moderators in the study.
The conceptual model of the dissertation can on this basis be depicted as follows:
Problem solving in groups: Communication by use of electronic media
Individual factors: Attitudes toward
idea generation and cognitive style
Innovative thinking by group
members
Properties of electronic
communication
Figure l.I: Conceptual model
1.2 Contribution
The role of modern information and communication technologies in stimulating and
managing innovation in organizations is becoming more important for every day that goes by.
This is clearly evident when observing large companies such as Nortel, Shell, and Proctor and
Gamble initiating "idea factories" in which teams interact by use of Internet-technology, with
the goal of generating ideas that can change existing business paradigms (Stepanek, 1999). In
order to be successful in generating innovative ideas, it is not sufficient to focus only on the
technological features that enable group interaction, but also the individuals that constitute the
groups, and how they perform in these rather novel settings, must be focused. In other words,
the most vital resources necessary for generating the desired ideas are individuals' abilities to
be creative. This is possessories of individuals, and may be influenced by the way interaction
with others is effectuated. The role of ICT in group/team work focusing on idea generation
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must therefore be to support the individuals' innovative thinking in the best possible ways,
which again accentuate the importance of knowledge of the relationship between
communication media qualities and individuals' innovative thinking.
The relevance of this research focus can be attributed to two main factors. First and foremost,
the research may increase our understanding ofboth the virtues and shortcoming of electronic
media for group interaction when it comes to the individual group members' thinking
processes, and how important a well-considered selection of communication media is for the
outcome wee seek. This, again, is relevant as convergence and integration of information and
communication technologies result in an increase in organizational members' opportunities
for interaction along different types of communication channels. This integrated media
environment will influence and, to some extent, shape human interaction, which necessitates a
deliberate selection of communication media based on both their positive and negative
qualities with reference to the tasks that are to be accomplished and the purpose of the
interaction. The second factor that makes this research highly relevant is related to the
increasing importance of innovation in the information economy. Along with, and partiallyas
a consequence of, the increasing use of K'T, we experience a need for a stronger focus on
customization and differentiation of products and services. The number of factors that
competitive organizations have to optimize is rising, and the knowledge needed for any
economic activity has become highly specialized. Putting things to the extremes,
organizations' speed and quality of innovation processes are basically matters of death or
survival in the information economy. How, then, can information technologies be used to
facilitate innovative thinking? Providing an answer to this question will be the managerial
contribution of this research.
1.3 Outline ofthe dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows: In part II, I present and discuss the theoretical
constructs that are used to build the research model. This literature review is divided into
three chapters: In chapter 2, called innovative thinking, I discuss the different processes
involved in effective idea generation and problem solving, and how different thinking
processes are manifested in language. In chapter 3, individual differences: attitudes and
cognitive style, I present and discuss how individuals' attitudes toward idea generation and
cognitive styles might affect the components of the idea generation processes that were
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presented in chapter 2. The final chapter of part II (chapter 4), is called communication media:
capabilities, and here I present a categorization ofvarious media capabilities with reference to
the degree to which the media support and enable various affordances/properties that
characterize all communication situations. In this discussion, the affordances that I find most
important for the innovative thinking processes presented in chapter 2 are defined.
In part III, I first present the conceptual model, where I delineate the relationships between the
constructs that are discussed in the literature review. More specifically, I illustrate how
affordances supported (to a certain degree) by various communication media may impact on
manifestations of innovative thinking processes. I also point out my assumption of the
moderating effects of individuals' attitudes toward idea generation and cognitive styles on
these relationships. Second, hypotheses regarding the main effects of affordances on
innovative thinking processes, and the moderating effects of individual differences, are put
forth.
Part IV concerns the methodological approach of the research. More specifically, in chapter 6
(method), I describe the research design applied, and discuss how the affordances
(independent variables) were manipulated. I further present how measures ofboth dependent
and independent variables were developed. The last chapter of this part, results and analysis
(chapter 7), consists of a presentation of the results of the statistical tests that were effectuated
in order to test the hypotheses proposed in chapter 5.
In the fifth and last part of the dissertation, I first discuss the results of the empirical research,
and present potential explanations for the findings (chapter 8). Thereafter (in chapter 9), I
discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical implications, limitations of the study, and
the dissertation is ended with some suggestions for future research.
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Part II
- Literature Review -
In this part, I describe the theoretical platform of the research. I start by clarifying my
perspective on innovative thinking in chapter 2. This includes a discussion of both cognitive
and social aspects involved in the process, and the chapter is ended by describing the concepts
that I use in the conceptual model. Chapter 3 deals with individual differences that are
important when it comes to innovative thinking, and in chapter 4 I discuss qualities of
communication media that are relevant for group collaboration aiming at producing
innovative ideas. Similar to chapter 2, the last two chapters in this part also end with a
selection and definition of the constructs (individual differences in chapter 3 and
communication media affordances in chapter 4) that I use in the research model.
7
2 Innovative thinking
In this chapter I discuss the process of innovative thinking in the context of idea generation in
a problem solving situation. I start by defining relevant concepts like thinking, innovation,
and idea generation, and further discuss what kinds of cognitive processes that are involved in
the idea generation phase of problem solving activities. The last part of the chapter concerns
manifestations of these cognitive processes in language, and the chapter is ended with a
description of two different concepts that I find important for the purposes of this research and
which will be used as dependent variables in the study.
2.1 Introduction
The field of innovation is very diverse; innovation research has emanated from many
academic disciplines including management, psychology, economics, and sociology, among
others. Within these and other disciplines, researchers tend to conceptualize innovation in
different ways (Read, 2000). One of the initial difficulties in innovation research is therefore
to define exactly what innovation is. Authors have made distinctions between studies of the
"diffusion" and "adoption" of innovations, as well as between studies of "innovating" and
"innovativeness" (Damanpour, 1991). One central point of contention in this respect is
whether innovation is a process or an outcome.
For the purpose ofthis study, innovation is understood as a process of creating or modifying
an idea and developing it to produce products, services, processes, structures, or policies that
are new to the organization (Zhuang, 1995; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Read, 2000). The stages
or phases in the innovation process are conceived to encompass the generation, development,
and implementation of new ideas and behaviors (Blazevic & Lievens, 2002). This
conceptualization of innovation is highly related to organizational creativity. Woodman et al.
(1993) define organizational creativity as "the creation of a valuable, useful new product,
service, idea, procedure, or process by individuals working together in a complex social
system" (p. 293). They frame the definition of organizational creativity as a subset of the
broader domain of innovation. That is, even though much innovation involves creativity,
innovation can also include the adaptation of preexisting products or processes created outside
of the organization.
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2.2 Innovativethinking in idea generation
This study will focus on the idea generation phase. Both innovation and organizational
creativity are initiated with idea generation, but based on the distinction between these
concepts outlined above, the process of idea generation can be viewed as slightly broader for
innovation than for creativity. "Creative idea generation" includes finding solutions (ideas,
products, processes, etc.) that are new to the market, while "innovative idea generation"
involves finding solutions that are new to the adopting unit. In this understanding of the
concepts, all creative ideas are innovative, but an innovative idea is not necessarily creative.
In spite of this difference, I perceive the idea-generating process to be relatively similar in
both innovative and creative processes, and I will therefore not distinguish creative idea
generation from innovative idea generation. In general, the goal of idea generation is to create
a pool of candidate ideas for further evaluation, and ultimately, implementation.
Successful idea generation is related to certain thinking processes. The concept of thinking is
often construed as "an umbrella term for a range of processes associated with "high-level"
cognition, such as reasoning, categorization, and judgment and decision making" (Holyoak &
Spellman, 1993: p. 266. My italics). In a problem solving situation, the first process that needs
to be initiated is a search for alternatives. That means that the decision makers or problem
solvers have to collect information that is relevant to the problem, and which may contribute
to, or are necessary for, a successful change. After the search for alternatives, the decision
makers need to select one specific solution that they find most appropriate for the task they
face.
There exists little controversy regarding the importance of these two "opposite" phases to be
present in idea generation activities; in other words, successful completion of idea generation
entails a combination of divergent and convergent thinking. The following discussion of
cognitive processes involved in idea generation will therefore be based on the distinction
between divergence and convergence.
2.2.1 The roles of divergent and convergent thinking in idea generation
The distinction between divergence and convergence is, among other things, used in
describing different thinking procedures necessary for successful problem solving. Ever since
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Alex Osborn launched the modem wave of creative thinking in business with his 1942 book,
How to Think U/, effective creative problem solving techniques emphasize divergent,
impractical thinking before developing a practical solution. Thus, in a problem solving
context, exercising divergent thinking involves starting with a specific problem and
generating various options and perspectives on the problem. Convergent thinking follows the
divergent process, and acts to narrow down the options available to obtain a number of
"satisfying" solutions to the problem (see figure 2.1).
Divergent process Convergent process
Figure 2.1: Divergent and convergent thinking
In this context, divergence involves branching behavior that explores and expands in different
directions, and divergent thinking and behavior thus refer to going off in new directions rather
than thinking solelyon one solution, and deriving a variety of ideas from given information.
The goal of divergence is to generate many different ideas about a topic in a short period of
time. It involves breaking a topic down into its various component parts in order to gain
insight about the various aspects of the topic. Divergence typically occurs in a spontaneous,
free-flowing manner, such that the ideas are generated in a random, unorganized fashion.
Following divergent thinking, the ideas and information will be organized using convergent
IAlex F. Osborn, (1942): How to Think Up.McGraw-Hill, New York.
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thinking; i.e., putting the various ideas back together in some organized, structured way.
Convergence is an integrating and narrowing process that focuses on testing and exploiting a
given direction. It reduces the dimensions or complexity of a system, and thus refers to
finding an appropriate or "correct" solution to a stated problem.
Based on the discussion above, my understanding of the idea generation concept can be
expressed as follows: "Idea generation is a process that consists of both divergent and
convergent thinking with the objective of creating the best possible idea or solution to a
problem". In this process, it may be reasonable to consciously separate divergent thinking
from convergent thinking as people cannot simultaneously be creative and critical when
generating innovative and practical solutions. Hence, some authors advocate the deliberate
distinction between "idea-producing" (divergent) and "idea-selection" (convergent) thinking
processes. Within this general approach, two schools of thought have appeared. One school
allows for the use of judgmental and convergent thinking during idea production (e.g. Simon
et al., 1962), while the other one expressly prohibits any such thinking during idea production.
Belonging to the latter school of thought, Basadur et al. (1982) identified a sequenced two-
step thinking process called "ideation-evaluation". They defined "ideation" as the production
of ideas without evaluation, and "evaluation" as the application of judgment to the ideas
produced.
Basadur et al. (1982) argue that the deliberate separation between ideation and evaluation is
important. One of the reasons for making a clear distinction between these processes, and start
with a pure divergent process, is related to the need for the problem solvers to detach from
existing ways of doing things. That is, people may hold back ideas they think are stupid or
silly, and by this using divergent and convergent thinking interchangeably or even at the same
time. Similarly, the problem with accepting ideas that make sense right away is that the
reason they make sense up front is that they are based on what the problem solvers already
know from the past. In these situations, the productivity or effectiveness will at best be
improved marginally. To create significant improvements or entirely new products, services
or processes, those ideas that seem absolutely preposterous or unachievable at first are needed
(Basadur et al., 1982).
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Empirical research has supported both the general separation of idea production from idea
selection and the more specific ideation-evaluation process (Basadur et al., 1982; Basadur &
Finkbeiner, 1985; Joyner & Tunstall, 1970; Parnes et al., 1977). There are many methods or
techniques that can be used in order to ensure that ideation and evaluation are not done
simultaneously. One of the oldest and most widely used approaches emphasizing this
separation is the Osborn-Parnes model of creative problem solving. This model stresses four
critical rules that must apply for successful ideation: 1) withholding judgment', 2)
freewheeling', 3) generating a quantity of ideas", and 4) hitchhiking' on the ideas of others.
These four rules reflect the fact that idea generation is both a cognitive and social process
(Nagasundaram & Dennis, 1993; Dennis et al., 1999). People generally do not generate ideas
in isolation. Often they work with others as part of a formal or informal group to generate
ideas. Under these conditions, individuals first conceptualize an idea (cognitive process - e.g.
by use of hitchhiking) and then choose whether or not to contribute it (social process - e.g.
because ofjudgmental conditions) (Carfield et al., 2001).
2.3 Manifestations of convergent and divergent thinking in language
When ideas and comments are put forth, the characteristics and specific formulations of these
contributions are important for group processes. That is, the words and sentences that are used
when describing a situation and making contributions in group-based problem solving are
often critical in determining whether the problem solvers are able to improve the situation and
arriving at the best solutions. Referring to the impacts of "wrong" wordings in problem
solving, Basadur (1995a) speaks of "killer phrases" in brainstorming sessions. These are
expressions like "we already tried that", "it would cost too much", "all right in theory", or
"yes, but...", and help to narrow down the options available in a given problem solving
session. Sentences of this character are thus about convergence and not divergence, meaning
that they should only be used during the latter part of the idea generation process (figure 2.1).
2 Research in biological psychology has shown that judging is perceived as a threat that inhibits creativity.
Conversely, positive feedback increases the combination of divergent stimuli in new ways (Hughes, 1999).
3 Freewheeling means that it is all right to be "off the wall" in the idea creation process.
4 Experiments have shown that the last ideas, the ones beyond mental blocks and into the subconscious, are the
highest quality ideas (Hughes, 1999).
s Hitchhiking involves creating ideas that combine the best ideas of other members of the team.
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The counterparts of these expressions are sentences like "how might we ...", "in what kind of
ways ...", and "what is our real problem ...", and are more challenge-oriented. This means that
problems are framed in a positive manner and refer to challenges rather than unwanted
difficulties that have to be overcome.
I hold the view that environmental factors can influence (either facilitate or inhibit) both the
cognitive and the social elements of idea generation (cf. the discussion of cognitive and social
processes above). An important implication of this is that it may be possible to control or
organize environmental factors that are important for these processes. Environmental factors
like communication media capabilities are thus able (and likely) to encourage and discourage
specific cognitions and behavior (e.g. formulations of ideas and comments) relevant for
divergence and convergence in a group-based problem solving situation (the effects of
communication media capabilities on individuals and group processes will be elaborated on in
section 4.3). As discussed above, the particular selection of words and sentences can be
perceived as manifestations of the contributor's thinking processes, and can thus be reflecting
divergence and convergence. I therefore believe that a focus on manifestations of divergent
and convergent thinking processes in language is suitable for answering the research question
presented in section 1.1. The concepts of "divergent focus" and "convergent focus" will for
that reason be used as dependent variables in the study.
2.3.1 Divergent focus
Words and sentences that reflect divergent thinking generate variability. These formulations
are not about judgement and criticism, but rather encourage exploration of numerous ideas
(figure 2.1). Individuals whose wordings are of this character are perceived to have a
divergent focus of the idea generation process.
2.3.2 Convergentfocus
Whereas words and sentences reflecting divergent thinking generate variability, formulations
that result from convergent thinking generate orthodoxy. Thus, these are words and phrases
that acts to narrow down the available solutions to a problem (figure 2.1). Use of words and
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sentences of this character will in this study be regarded as a result of a convergent focus of
the idea generation process.
2.4 Conclusion
Successful idea generation is in any given situation dependent on a number offactors. Bearing
in mind that much problem solving in organizations involve group communication by use of
information technology, it is important to investigate whether communication media can
influence divergent and convergent thinking. How people think is manifested in their
language, and divergent and convergent thinking result in use of dissimilar words and phrases
when discussing and solving problems. I will use the concepts of "divergent focus" and
"convergent focus" as variables in order to capture divergent and convergent thinking
processes in this study.
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3 Individual differences: Attitudes and cognitive style
In this chapter, I discuss the role of individual differences in idea generation. I focus on the
concepts of attitudes (toward idea generation) and cognitive style, and the discussion results
in a selection and definition of two attitudinal constructs and a cognitive style continuum that
focuses on individuals' preferred strategies when solving problems. These constructs (both
attitudes and cognitive style) will be moderating variables in the study.
3.1 Attitudestoward idea generation
The Osborn-Parnes model of creative problem solving shows that idea generation is not just a
matter of cognition (cf. discussion in section 2.2.1). In this respect, Basadur and Finkbeiner
(1985) view ideation (and evaluation) as having both cognitive and attitudinal elements. That
is, in addition to the cognitive processes, "effective ideation may require specific attitudes
favoring this kind ofthinking, perhaps to help participants truly "let loose" and use more fully
their unencumbered imaginations" (p. 38). In other words, successful ideation necessitates
deferral of evaluation. Following this line of thinking, my understanding of idea generation
does not just include the pure "generative" or cognitive part of the process, but it also contains
individuals' attitudes that are related to the two distinct cognitive processes
(ideation/divergence and evaluation/convergence) involved in idea generation. Such attitudes
may for example impact on decisions of whether ideas that are produced should be put forth,
and are therefore important aspects of the idea generation process. The reason for this is that
ideas are of little value if they are not communicated and acted upon. Following this line of
reasoning, positive ideative attitudes may enhance cognitive ideative processes and
performance, and impair evaluative cognitive processes and performance. Conversely,
positive evaluative attitudes may enhance evaluative cognitive processes and performance,
while impairing ideative cognitive processes and performance. Accordingly, two important
consequences follow. First, by extension, individuals' attitudes toward idea generation can
indicate their potential for contributing positively (by convergent and convergent thinking) to
the two stages in idea generation processes, and second, it will be possible to facilitate
ideative and evaluative cognitive processes by controlling environmental factors that again
influence the corresponding attitudes. For these reasons, I will include attitudes toward idea
generation in this study.
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Attitudes can thus be seen as antecedents of cognitive processes. This is consistent with
several "general" theories concerning the linkage between attitudes and behavior, like Kraut's
(1976) training model suggesting a causal chain whereby attitude change leads to
performance change, and Fishbein and Azjen's (1975) theory of reasoned action proposing
that behavior can be predicted by individual attitudes and social norms. Further, in the field of
creativity research, Basadur et al. (1982) conducted a field experiment showing that practice-
oriented training resulted in improvements in divergent thinking attitudes that accompanied
improvements in divergent thinking practice and creative performance. Later, Basadur and
Finkbeiner (1985) also modeled how divergent thinking attitudes enhance divergent thinking
skills.
Basadur et al. (1982) and Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985) thus suggest that one may explain
differences in degrees of success achieved when using ideation by citing attitudinal factors
associated with the divergent thinking process. In other words, successful idea generation may
be achieved by altering persons' attitudes toward ideation and evaluation. Changing attitudes
is generally seen as a tardy process, however, and Basadur et al. (1982; 1986; 2000) stress
enduring training in order to change persons' attitudes. That is, in several field experiments,
they found that practice-oriented training resulted in improvements in divergent thinking
attitudes that accompanied improvements in divergent thinking practice. However, the
relationship between attitudes and behavior is problematic, and a focus on training effects on
attitudes may indicate a reverse order of the relationship between attitudes and practice as
suggested by the authors. That is, training in ideation forces the participants to perform
divergent thinking which again may influence their attitudes toward ideation. This is in
accordance with social perception theory (Bern, 1967), which proposes that people look back
at their behavior, consider it in light of the circumstances, and then infer what their attitude
about it must have been. Thus, even though persons have attitudes toward both ideation and
evaluation, it is not apparent that these attitudes precede or determine their behavior, and that
it is not the other way around.
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Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985) view attitudes associated with idea generation as analogous to
cognitive style. Cognitive style in creative problem solving, however, as measured by e.g. the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) (Mayers, 1987; Mayers & Briggs, 1952) or The Kirton
Adaptor-Innovator (KAI) Inventory (Kirton, 1976; 1987), is held to be a stable personality
trait, which is thus very hard to alter. People differ in their abilities to think divergently and
convergently - it is a personality trait (Guilford, 1967). Brophy (1998) points out that different
cognitive- and personality traits may accompany divergent and convergent thought. Divergent
thinkers are more likely to process diverse stimuli, organize thoughts flexibly, seek
knowledge about varied subjects, and form intuitions, and they are more intrinsically
motivated to solve problems creatively. Most people are either divergers or convergers, a few
are both.
In spite of this, Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985) argue that these attitudes can be moderated
(e.g. by training in creative problem solving), and perceive the constructs to be alterable. I
hold the view that cognitive style refers to more profound individual qualities underlying
human behavior than what attitudes do, and I therefore make a distinction between attitudes
toward idea generation and cognitive style. This means that while cognitive style is more or
less stable across situations, I believe that attitudes are more tied to the specific situations, and
can be altered and influenced (e.g. by environmental factors). In other words, when talking
about preferences for specific behavior in a group-based problem solving situation,
environmental factors play a significant role in inhibiting or endorsing these preferences.
Thus, even though the participants in group-based problem solving have attitudes that are
relatively stable across situations (when all other factors are excluded), it does not mean that
these attitudes or preferences will prevail in situations where there are environmental factors
that encourage or discourage specific attitudes or behavior. I therefore find it important to
include both attitudes and cognitive styles relevant for idea generation and problem solving as
moderators between situational variables (in this case media capabilities) and manifestations
of divergent and convergent thinking processes.
Basadur et al. (1982) identified several attitudinal constructs related to ideation. Two of these
constructs are "Preference for Ideation" and "Tendency to [Not] Make Premature Critical
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Evaluation of Ideas", and are measured by the Basadur 14 item Preference Scale6• Basadur
and colleagues have also identified several other attitudes (and developed measurement
scales) related to ideation. Two attitudes named "Valuing of New Ideas" and "Belief that
Creative Thinking is [Not] Bizarre" were investigated by Basadur and Hausdorf (1996), and
refined by Basadur et al. (1999). From this research, three new scales emerged (44 items),
though without achieving the same level of validity and reliability as for the two former
ideational measures. The attitudes were "Valuing New Ideas", "Belief that Creativity is Not
Only for a Select Few", and ''Not Feeling too Busy for New Ideas".
I will apply the two former constructs in this research, and there are two reasons for this
selection. First, several studies focusing on scale validation have been carried out, and the
Basadur 14 Item Preference Scale has been used in subsequent research (Basadur et al., 1986;
1990; 1992; Runco & Basadur, 1993). Second, I find these two distinct preferences as
representing divergent and convergent processes in a group-based problem solving situation,
and as described earlier, these two distinct processes are necessary for the realization of
successful innovative thinking in idea generation. I therefore believe that these constructs may
be significant when it comes to the specific framing of ideas and comments in a problem
solving situation, and thus are important moderators of the relationship between
environmental factors and the dependent variables (divergent focus and convergent focus).
3.1.1 Preferencefor ideation
The divergent aspect of the two-step thinking process described in the last chapter focuses on
generation of options, different points of view, and perceptions of facts and ideas, without any
critical judgment or analysis. As discussed in previous sections, there are attitudes related to
divergence or ideation that are accompanied by these cognitive elements. This is in
accordance with the view of Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985) who developed a model
describing how attitudinal processes enhance cognitive processes in problem solving.
With their focus on attitudes toward idea generation, Basadur et al. (1982) and Basadur and
Finkbeiner (1985) identified and refined the construct of "Preference for Ideation". The
•A Norwegian version ofthis scale is presented in appendix e.2.
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denotation of this construct concerns mind-sets such as being "less likely to jump to
conclusions as to what is the real problem", and "more open-minded to new ideas and
approaches"; "reacting more positively to new, unusual product ideas"; "being less prone to
negative evaluation during idea generation"; "achieving higher quantity and quality of
problem finding"; "being more likely to consider different problem definitions prior to
choosing one as best"; and "being more likely to pause to try new, unusual approaches"
(Basadur & Hausdorf, 1996: p. 22). A high preference for ideation may thus be associated
with performing the latter three operations or rules of the Osborn-Parnes creative problem
solving methodology well, and thereby triggering ideation and prohibiting evaluation
(Basadur & Finkbeiner, 1985).
3.1.2 Preferencefor evaluation
Another construct associated with an individual's attitude associated with ideation proposed
by Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985), is "Tendency to [Not] Make Premature Critical Evaluation
of Ideas". Originally, this construct measures premature convergence. However, with
reference to the denotation of the construct "preference for ideation" described above, the
mind-sets associated with this construct are more or less opposite. I therefore believe this
construct to be useful for the purposes of this research.
Related to the Osborn-Parnes rules for successful ideation, a low tendency for critical
evaluation of ideas might be associated with high scores on the first operation (Basadur &
Finkbeiner, 1985). In contrast, a high score on this construct should result in low performance
on the Osborn-Pames rules for successful ideation. Basadur and Finkbeiner (ibid.) developed
an internally valid and reliable measure of this construct. And as stated in the previous
section, the construct is in many ways antagonistic to preference for ideation. I will therefore
use the term "preference for evaluation" for this particular attitude in this study.
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idea generation
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ideation
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evaluation
Figure 3.1: Idea generation attitude constructs
3.2 Cognitive style
In addition to evaluating an individual's idea generation performance based on the overall
level of creativity, idea generation can also be viewed in terms of cognitive style and the types
of innovative or creative products that are favored (Scott & Bruce, 1994). Individual
preferences and cognitive style playa critical role in idea generation, and a significant amount
of research focuses on identifying ways to systematically measure and use them (Amabile,
1983; Ford, 1996; Woodman et al., 1993). Some people tend to be systematic thinkers,
building on ideas and facts in the problem and focusing on rationality and logic, while others
rely more heavily on intuition and imagery, looking beyond current rules, boundaries, and
rationallogic (Garfield et aL, 2001; Jabri, 1991; Scott & Bruce, 1994).
Cognitive style describes individual differences in information processing characteristics, that
is, how individuals' thinking is affected by qualitatively different dispositions (Martinsen,
1995). There are many different style theories, but all of them attempt to do the same thing.
They all try to categorise individuals as "types". Witkin (1962), for example, argued that there
are essentially two kinds of cognitive style - the "field dependent" and the "field
independent". Field dependent people tend to organize information into clustered "wholes"
whilst field independent people organize information into conceptual groupings. Other early
theories of cognitive style are the work of Pask (1972), who differentiated between
"serialists" and "holists", and Kagan et al. (1964) who proposed the two dimensions of
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"impulsive" and "reflective". One more recent theory is that of Riding (1991) who refined a
great deal of the best work from which the two basic bipolar dimensions of cognitive style
emerged. These are the "wholist-analytic" and the "verbal-imagery" styles. The former style
determines whether an individual processes information as a whole or in parts, while the latter
dictates whether an individual is inclined to represent information during verbal thought, or as
mental images. One of the most influential researchers on the importance and effects of
individuals' thinking styles is Robert Sternberg, who in his theory a/mental self-government
(Sternberg, 1997; Stemberg & Grigorenko, 1997) distinguishes between the legislative style
(a person who enjoys generating ideas and doing things on hislher own), the executive style (a
person who prefers to follow guidelines established by others and to utilize the ideas of others
to do hislher work), and the judicial style (a person who prefers to evaluate the ideas of
others). The theory suggests that everyone possesses every style to some degree, but that the
strengths of preferences differ across individuals.
In general, cognitive styles are defined as bipolar (or in some situations as multipolar)
constructs where the different poles have some attributes, and they should be uncorrelated
with ability and describe "how" rather than "how much" (Martinsen, 1995). A case in point of
this is the understanding of cognitive style found in The Adaptation Innovation Theory
(Kirton, 1976; 1987; 1988). This is one of the most widely used theories of cognitive styles in
creativity research, and posits that style differences lie on a normally distributed continuum,
ranging from high adaption to high innovation. The theory sharply distinguishes between
level and style of creativity, problem solving and decision making, and is concerned only with
style. Both potential and evident capacity aside, the theory states that people are creative,
solve problems, and make decisions in different ways. The key to the distinction is that the
more adaptive prefer their problems to be associated with more structure, and tend toward
using approaches that seek incremental changes that adapt or stretch the current problem
elements or ideas. The more innovative individuals are comfortable solving problems with
less structure and are less concerned about consensus regarding structure compared to the
more adaptive individuals. They lean toward more revolutionary ideas by redefining or
restructuring the problem rather than accepting the current situation as the starting point
(Garfield et al., 2001).
21
Another theory that is related to The Adaptation Innovation Theory, is the cognitive style
taxonomy developed by Kaufmann (1979; 1995). This is called the Assimilator-Explorer (A-
E) theory of cognitive styles, and concerns individual differences in preferences for problem
solving strategies. These strategies are described as rule-following and novelty-seeking
strategies. In contrast to The Adaptation Innovation Theory, however, the A-E theory does not
see individuals as rigidly looked into one style or another independent of the situation and
task at hand. Rather, people are seen as "switchers" that are able to monitor their problem
solving approach in various ways depending on the situation. Support of stability in strategy
preferences across task scenarios has nevertheless been gained, and individuals may be
reliably classified according to their (major) preferred orientation (Kaufmann, 1995).
Naturally, this should have implications for individuals' idea generation processes in problem
solving situations.
Based on the discussion of various cognitive style theories above, both the Adaptation
Innovation Theory and the A-E theory are appropriate for the purposes of this research.
Regarding the former theory, however, the question of whether measurement of cognitive
styles as used in this theory really is an indicator of level of creativity has been raised as
measures of innovative orientation often significantly and substantially correlate positively
with various indicators of level of creativity (Goldsmith & Matherly, 1986; Isaksen & Puccio,
1988; Kaufmann, 1988; Kaufmann, 1995). Also, differences in availabilities of the
measurement instruments favor the A-E theory, and I will therefore apply this theory of
cognitive style in the study. The A-E theory distinguishes between Assimilators and Explorers
as extreme points on a continuum, implying that individuals' cognitive styles include both
"assimilative" and "explorative" elements. Keeping this in mind, individuals that have a
propensity toward one of the two extremes will be labeled "Assimilator" or "Explorer", and in
order to clarify the distinction between the two styles, the terms Assimilators and Explorers as
used in the discussion below refer to the ideal types of the cognitive styles.
3.2.1 Assimilators
The problem solving behavior subsumed under Assimilator preferences is guided by what will
be described as a "rational strategy" or a "rule-following strategy" (Kaufmann, 1995;
Martinsen, 1995). The essence of this strategy is that individuals with this preference will tend
22
to follow established rules or schemes when solving problems. They will try to stretch
established and well known principles as far as possible, and they are held to be more
conformist, rule bound and rigid, less open and more anxious than Explorers. This rational
strategy involves devoting maximum effort to upholding existing patterns of thought, and
Assimilators are therefore seen as more prone to use logic, being more analytically oriented,
and more efficient when it comes to computation procedures than Explorers (Martinsen,
1995). In novel problem situations, Assimilators' preferences are, according to Kaufmann
(1995), "aimed at mapping the situation on to prototypical, previously mastered analogous
situations" (p. 62).
3.2.2 Explorers
Kaufmann (1995) argues that the extreme "Explorer" preference, in sharp contrast to the
rational strategy of Assimilators, "entails constantly seeking novel solution alternatives, even
in problem situations that are easily mastered by the application of standard schemes" (p. 63).
Further, compared to Assimilators, Explorers are more creative and better at restructuring
because they are more open, novelty seeking, and flexible. The problem solving strategy
associated with Explorers can thus be described as a novelty seeking strategy. In other words,
the extreme explorer preference entails constantly seeking stimulus variability. Individuals
with such a preference will be open for experiences, and tuned to a relatively high degree of
uncertainty and variation as maximally attractive.
3.3 Conclusion
Attitudes toward idea generation and cognitive styles are significant factors when considering
individuals' idea generation processes and abilities. I therefore believe that differences in
attitudes and cognitive styles of individuals are believed to moderate the relationships
between media capabilities and divergent and convergent thinking processes. I will now turn
to a discussion of media capabilities that may be able to influence the constructs that are
perceived to be manifestations of innovative thinking processes.
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4 Communication media: Capabilities
This chapter starts with an introduction and overview of research on media capabilities or
qualities, and based on the specific research focus and problem question, constructs
(properties or affordances) from various contributions to this research field are discussed. The
chapter is ended by a discussion of why and how the selected constructs (the independent
variables) are important for divergent and convergent thinking processes (the dependent
variables).
4.1 Introduction
New information and communication technologies enable extensive interaction and
communication between individuals both within organizations and across organizational
boundaries. This increase in electronically mediated interaction is not prolific per se, but
requires well-considered choices regarding use of specific communication media in order for
the interacting parties to obtain the desired outcomes. That is, all communication media have
characteristics or qualities that lend themselves better to some situations than others. The
choice of media must therefore be made on basis of the tasks at hand and the particular
situation in which the interacting parties are in.
4.2 Characterizationof capabilities
Many theories have been developed to categorize media qualities and explain media effects
on communication outcomes (see e.g. Fulk & Boyd, 1991). One of the most widely used
media categorization theories is Media Richness Theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986), which argues
that task performance will be improved when tasks' information needs are matched to a
medium's richness or it's capabilities to facilitate shared meaning. Daft and Lengel (ibid.)
define information richness as the "ability of information to change understanding within a
time interval" (p. 560), and further claim that the reasons for differences in richness include
''the medium's capacity for immediate feedback, the number of cues and channels utilized,
personalization, and language variety" (p. 560). Central to media richness theory is the idea
that media capable of sending "rich" information are better suited to solve tasks where there
are possibilities for multiple interpretations of the available information (high equivocality),
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while media that are "lean" are best suited for tasks with uncertain information (low
equivocality).
Empirical tests of media richness theory have not been very supportive, particularly for new
communication media (most computer-mediated communication will by media richness
theory be understood as "relatively lean" communication) (Burke & Chidambaram, 1999;
Dennis & Kinney, 1998; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997; Lee, 1994; Markus, 1994; Valacich et aL,
1993; El-Shinnawy & Markus, 1992; Kinney & Watson, 1992; Rice & Shook, 1990; Trevino
et al., 1990). A specific feebleness of the theory is that "richness" (or "leanness") is perceived
as an intrinsic and unalterable property of communication media. However, media are not
monolithic, and media richness is thus not invariant. The richness or leanness of one specific
medium will to some extent depend upon how it is configured (e.g. one email system may
provide a limited number of cues (text only), while another may also include graphics and
video). Recognizing the weaknesses of Media Richness Theory, Dennis and Valacich (1999)
introduced a new theory, Media Synchronicity Theory, which focuses on the abilities of media
to support the communication processes used by individuals as they work on tasks. These
authors suggest that media have five capabilities that are important in understanding the
effects of media use on the ability to communicate and process information, which thus affect
the efficiency and effectiveness of the communication processes. These capabilities are: 1)
immediacy of feedback, 2) symbol variety, 3) parallelism, 4) rehearsability, and 5)
reprocessabi1ity. The authors further argue that these media capabilities better reflect the
potential of the media, and that task performance is enhanced by matching these capabilities
to communication settings.
Both media richness theory and media synchronicity theory categorize media attributes in
terms of what kind of properties or capabilities the different media possess. Adopting a wider
perspective, Te'eni (2001) suggests the following characterizing media attributes of any
electronically mediated communication: channel capacity, adaptiveness, and interactivity.
Channel capacity is an important property determining media richness, and includes the
potential to transmit a high variety of cues and languages. Adaptiveness refers to the potential
to personalize a message to a particular receiver. Finally, interactivity is a multifaceted
concept with many dimensions, and several taxonomies for categorizing electronic media
according to interactivity level have been developed. Hoffman and Novak (1996) identify two
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types of interactivity; machine interactivity and person interactivity. The first type refers to
the extent to which users can participate in modifying the form and content of a mediated
environment in real time. Person interactivity is defined as interactivity between people that
occurs through a medium or is unmediated, as in the case of face-to-face interaction. Thus,
machine interactivity is interactivity with the medium, while person interactivity is
interactivity through the medium. These two interactivity characterizations relate to two
research traditions occupied with the study of communication and interaction by means of
electronic media; computer-mediated communication (eMe) and human-computer
interaction (HeI). In the first perspective, media facilitate interactive person to person
communication, and the in the latter perspective, interactivity is defined in terms of media
characteristics (Thorbjørnsen, 2002). Because of the differences in the understandings of
interactivity, the two research traditions, eMe and Hel, focus on different dimensions of the
concept. While research on Hel emphasize properties like synchronicity, message
relatedness, and contingency, the eMe tradition focus on concepts like participation,
identification, and degree of social presence (ibid.).
Relevant to both person interactivity and machine interactivity, Burgoon et al. (2000a; 2000b)
suggest two ways of characterizing the concept. First, it can be considered in terms of the
structural properties of the medium, or second, by qualitative experiences as perceived by the
user. Regarding the first categorization type, Burgoon et al. (ibid.) integrate the various
analyses of media affordances into an extensive set of properties, consisting of: l)
participation (the extent to which the interacting parties are actively engaged in the
interaction), 2) mediation (whether the interaction is mediated or not), 3) contingency (the
extent to which one party's queries, responses, and comments are dependent on the prior ones
of the cointeractant), 4) media and information richness (whether the format utilizes one or
more modalities such as text, audio, visual, and the extent to which it supports symbol variety
to present "rich" and "poor" social information), 5) geographical propinquity (whether the
parties are physically co-located or distributed), 6) synchronicity (whether the interaction is
same-time, which permits immediate bidirectional feedback, or asynchronous, which permits
rehearsability and editability), 7) identification (the extent to which participants are fully
identified, partially identified or anonymous), 8) parallelism (whether the format permits
concurrent communication and multiple addressees, as in the case of electronic brainstorming,
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or only permits serial messages), and 9) anthropomorphism (the extent to which the system
interface simulates or incorporates humanlike characteristics).
As shown in the discussion above, communication media can be described and evaluated in
terms of their abilities to enable specific aspects or properties of the communication process.
In other words, all communication processes can be characterized by certain affordances or
properties, and communication media differ in their capabilities to support and enable these
affordances. In this way, outcomes of mediated interaction can to some extent depend on the
medium that is used. As situational factors determine which communication characteristics or
affordances that must be present (or are preferred), users are likely to perceive the usefulness
(and thus utilization) of different media in light of the situation or tasks that are to be solved.
Based on this discussion, I find it purposeful to place emphasis on specific affordances that
may influence divergent and convergent thinking processes in group-based problem solving,
and not on the technology itself. The following affordances are perceived to be particularly
relevant for the study: "synchronicity", "parallelism", and "identification". The rationale
underlying this selection will be elaborated on in a later section, but first I discuss the
denotations of synchronicity, parallelism, and identification, and present my theoretical
definitions of these concepts.
4.2.1 Synchronicity
This affordance encompasses the capabilities that Dennis and Valacich (1999) labeled
"immediacy of feedback" and "rehearsability", and it may also take in "reprocessability".
Synchronicity refers to whether the interaction is same-time or not. A high level of
synchronicity enables the interacting parties to give immediate feedback. Immediacy of
feedback is the extent to which a medium enables users to give rapid responses to the
communications they receive (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Te'eni, 2001). It is the ability of a
medium to support rapid bidirectional communication, and has been shown to affect
communication outcomes by increasing interaction between the parties, allowing rapid
assessment and modification of the message (Zmud et al., 1990). Media that provide
immediate feedback capabilities also enable the sender to encourage feedback from the
receiver, or to use trial references for the receiver's agreement and understanding of the
message. Dennis and Kinney (1998) found that the level of immediacy of feedback for a
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given medium can impact the speed of the decision - use of media with more immediate
feedback leads to faster decisions, but it did not affect other communication outcomes such as
decision quality, consensus, or satisfaction, regardless of level of equivocality of the task.
Low degree of synchronicity enables rehearsability. This refers to the extent to which the
media enable the sender to rehearse or fine tune the message before sending. The sender of a
message is in this case given the opportunity to carefully formulate a message before it is
being sent to ensure that the intended meaning is expressed exactly, with no extraneous
information. Likewise, a low degree of synchronicity can also render possible
reprocessability. This refers to the extent to which a message can be reexamined or processed
again within the context of the communication event. This capability affects information
processing by allowing individuals to revisit messages for further consideration and
deliberation. However, a low degree of synchronicity is not sufficient for reprocessability to
be possible; the medium must also enable the receiver to store the information. Low degree of
synchronicity only gives the receiver more time to respond to messages.
Based on the discussion above, I define synchronicity as "the extent to which the participants
engaged in a group-based problem solving situation can give immediate feedback to the
postings of other group members, and receive immediate feedback on their own postings from
other group members". I am concerned with the level of synchronicity as perceived by the
participants in a group-based problem solving situation (as people may have different
perceptions of affordances-Ievels provided by the same technology). The highest level of
synchronicity is thus most likely to occur when interaction takes place in real time, and
accordingly, the level will decrease along with increasing time lag between messages from
one participant and responses to these messages from another participant. The level of
synchronicity is in other words reverse proportional to the time passing by before feedback
can be given. It is important to emphasize that, in this understanding of the concept, a high
level of synchronicity does not assure immediate feedback; it is rather related to the
opportunities that the participants have for giving rapid responses to the messages of others.
Low synchronicity thus implies that the participants involved in interaction do not have the
opportunity to give and receive feedback on an immediate basis.
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4.2.2 Parallelism
Parallelism is the number of simultaneous conversations that can effectively take place. Many
electronic media can be structured to enable multiple interacting parties in one session, thus
parallelism can increase the amount of information that can be simultaneous transmitted and
received, but it can also decrease the effectiveness of information processing as it may lead to
information overload. I define parallelism as "the participants' opportunities to be engaged in
simultaneous dialogues in a group-based problem solving situation". High parallelism thus
gives the participants opportunities to be engaged in multiple dialogues at the same time, and
therefore they do not have to take turns in utterance of contributions. Low parallelism, on the
other hand, means that all participants have to be engaged in a single dialogue, implying that
only one member of the group can utter his/her ideas and comments at the same time (as is the
situation for FtF interaction). I am also for this affordance concerned with the levels as
perceived by the participants in a group-based problem solving situation.
Given the understanding and definitions of parallelism and synchronicity outlined in the
previous sections, I need to give specific attention to the relationship between these
constructs. Although synchronicity and parallelism refer to distinct characteristics of
communication processes, the constructs are not totally unrelated. In fact, the synchronicity
level in a given situation might impact on the degree of parallelism that can be realized in the
same situation. More specifically, in situations where the level of synchronicity is low, the
level of parallelism will most likely be high. In situations where the level of synchronicity is
high, however, the level of parallelism might be high or low. The reason for this is that the
participants involved in interaction characterized by low synchronicity are given the
opportunity to use more time to reprocess the received messages from others, and also use
more time to formulate their own contributions. The group members do not expect immediate
responses. Thus, as a consequence of the time lag of the interaction, the involved participants
can probably focus on several dialogues at the same time. Further, the problem of
simultaneous talking (parallel conversations or utterances) that might occur in synchronous
interaction (e.g. face-to-face) is hard to imagine (non-existing as far as I know) in situations
where the synchronicity is low. So when the level of synchronicity is low, the participants
involved in interaction do not have to take turns uttering their contributions, but can probably
attend to multiple dialogues simultaneously. This means that in situations where the level of
29
synchronicity is low, the level of parallelism is most likely high, but it does not imply that a
reverse relationship exists. The level of parallelism in situations characterized by high
synchronicity depends on the medium that is used for interaction, and can be located at any
point on the parallelism scale/continuum.
4.2.3 Identification
There are various types and levels of anonymity, depending on the factors that lead group
members to feel more or less anonymous, hence group interaction cannot be simply viewed as
anonymous or identified (Valacich et al., 1992a; 1992b). Valacich et al. describe two types of
anonymity. First, content anonymity is defined as "the extent to which group members can
identify the source of a particular contribution to the group" (p. 224), and this anonymity type
is provided when embedded identifiers, which identify a contributions' source, are absent.
The second type of anonymity, process anonymity, refers to "the extent to which group
members can determine whether or not another group member is participating" (Valacich et
al., 1992b, p. 223), and is provided when the contributor cannot be determined by direct
observation.
There are many factors that may affect the level of anonymity, and the particular
configuration of the communication media is important in this respect (other factors are e.g.
group size, group composition, and group member proximity). Content anonymity is easy to
control and manipulate in communication systems, while process anonymity necessitates
physical separation between the participants, and cannot be manipulated the same way as
content anonymity by use oftechnological means. Despite acknowledging that full anonymity
(and full identification) cannot be obtained solely by specific system configurations, I will not
distinguish between these types of anonymity, but rather focus on the overall level of
identification as perceived by the participants.
I define identification as "the extent to which the contributions (ideas and comments) of the
participants in a group-based problem solving situation are linked with the identities of the
contributors". The term "linked" in this definition is not to be understood in a solely
technological sense, but may also represent a cognitive linkage made by the group members
regarding the relationship between contributors and contributions. A lack of process
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anonymity may therefore result in(.~~ "ore on identification even though the
communication medium is configured ~ a way that enables full content anonymity. The two
extreme points on this scale are thus 1) a situation where the participants can put forth their
ideas and comments without the other members of the group knowing the originator ofthese
ideas and comments, and 2) a situation where all members of a group always know the
identities of the contributors. Similar to the other affordances, I am also in this case interested
in the level of identification as perceived by the participants in a group-based problem solving
situation.
4.3 Influence of affordances ou individuals and group processes
In a group-based problem solving situation, it is common to speak of process gains and
process losses as results of elements like group characteristics, task characteristics, context
characteristics, reward structure, etc. (McGrath, 1984). An individual's contribution (e.g. idea,
comment, criticism, etc.) in group work is shaped by this context of enhancing and stifling
forces (Valacich et al., 1992a). In other words, certain aspects of the situation improve
outcomes, while others impair outcomes, and the results of problem solving activities are thus
contingent upon the balance of the process gains and losses (Connollyet al., 1990). There are
many different sources of gains and losses that can be attributed to situational factors of group
interaction. Reviewing the work of Lamm and Trommsdorff (1973), Shaw (1981), Steiner
(1972), Osborn (1957), Hackman and Kaplan (1974), Hill (1982), Diehl and Stroebe (1987),
Jablin and Seibold (1978), Albanese and Van Fleet (1985), Hiltz and Turoff(1985), Hirokawa
and Pace (1983), and Mintzberg et al. (1976), Nunamaker et al. (199lb) list several process
gains and process losses that, depending upon the situation, vary in strength (or may not exist
at all) (the list is presented in appendix A).
The occurrences (and strengths) of the group processes are contingent upon the characteristics
and configurations of group-based work, and Iwill concentrate on sources of relevant process
losses in the discussion of affordances and group processes. Characteristics of the technology
used in a CMC setting may affect the process losses, and synchronicity, parallelism, and
identification are among the most influential affordances in this respect.
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4.3.1 Importance a/synchronicity
In an environment with high degree of synchronicity, verbal persons/extroverts often
dominate the conversation, and some group members may therefore feel that their
contributions are not required and are thus inclined to free ride. Free riding refers to the
tendency of some group members to rely on other group members to accomplish the task
without their contributions (Valacich et al., 1992a). Conversely, in situations with low degree
of synchronicity, group members are not continuously updated on what the others are doing,
and must therefore work more individually. In these situations, the participants feel more
individually accountable for the results. Low degree of synchronicity may in this way reduce
free riding and social loafing. Further, in such a situation, there may be more social pressure
on all group members (as perceived by each participant) to make contributions. Asynchronous
interaction also tends to be less disruptive to group members (Kock, 1997), thus low degree of
synchronicity will also increase the time and amount of evaluation the participants can exert
on their ideas. In other words, low degree of synchronicity may result in higher evaluation
apprehension than we might experience in situations with high synchronicity. Further, CMC
with low synchronicity enables high degree of parallelism, and in situations with low
synchronicity, the process losses associated with low degree of parallelism discussed in
section 4.3.2 will therefore be reduced.
4.3.2 Importance a/parallelism
A significant problem that arises in problem solving groups is production blocking, which
occurs when something prevents verbalization of ideas as they occur (Shepherd et al., 1995).
In these situations, a participant may forget an idea while waiting for a tum to speak, or may
devote attention to remembering an idea, and by this becomes too distracted to generate new
ideas (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Nunamaker et al., 1991a; Nunamaker et al., 1991b). With
parallel communication, process losses from air time fragmentation (i.e. the group must
partition available speaking time among members), attenuation blocking (i.e. group members
are prevented from contributing comments as they occur, or forget or suppress them later in
the meeting because they seem less original, relevant or important), and concentration
blocking (i.e. fewer comments are made because members concentrate on remembering
comments, rather than thinking on new ones, until they can contribute them) can be
significantly reduced (Nunamaker et al., 1991b). According to Nunamaker et al., the
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importance of parallelism depends on the number of participants involved in interaction. For
small groups, parallelism is of minor importance. In contrast, parallelism is found to be
important for large groups because it enables all members to participate and be less
susceptible to process losses that occur, regardless of the function performed (Dennis et al.,
1997; Gallupe et al., 1992; Valacich et al., 1992a).
4.3.3 Importance ofidentification
In a group-based problem solving situation, an individual's inclination to act, and the nature
of the act, are influenced by other group members' actions or just their mere presence.
Previous research has shown that anonymity can influence the perceptions and social
interactions of individual group members (Pinsonneault & Heppe1, 1997). According to
Diener (1979), anonymity is an important component of de-individuation', which can lead to
behavior that is normally kept in check by social mechanisms. In group tasks like decision
making, problem solving, and idea generation, the loosening of social bonds may have
noticeable value as the participants are concerned about how others perceive their ideas
(Connollyet al., 1990; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Nunamaker et aL, 1991b). Several authors
have identified the anonymity option as a particular virtue of Group Decision Support
Systems in that anonymity encourages full participation of group members that otherwise
would have been socially inhibited from expressing unpopular, novel or heretical opinions
(Kraemer & King, 1988; Nunamaker et al. 1988). Common problems experienced by groups
involved with decision making and problem solving include the extreme influence exerted by
high-status members, the lack of acknowledgement of low-status members' ideas, and a low
tolerance exhibited toward minority or controversial opinions (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987).
On the positive side, the group might provide encouragement, stimulation or reward for
creative contributions, and on the negative side, contributors might anticipate embarrassment,
hostile evaluation, conformity pressures or other punishments for proposing unusual ideas
(Collaros & Anderson, 1969). Thus, anonymity may reduce the pressure to conform and
evaluation apprehension (i.e. fear of negative evaluation causes group members to withhold
7 De-individuation refers to the feeling of becoming submerged in the group, and of losing awareness of one's
own individuality and that of other group members (Connollyet al., 1990).
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ideas and comments), but it may also increase free riding as it is more difficult to determine
when someone is free riding (Nunamaker et al., 199Ib).
4.4 Conclusion
Communication media can be characterized by their abilities to support various aspects of
communication processes. In order to say something about how successful a specific
technology will be for solving a particular organizational task involving computer-mediated
communication, it is necessary to determine what aspects of communication processes that are
important for successful accomplishment of this task, and how well the technology is able to
support these aspects. In this study I focus on three affordances that to certain extents are
supported or enabled by various communication media; synchronicity, parallelism, and
identification. These affordances are seen as particularly influential factors in group
processes, and I will investigate how they may influence divergent and convergent thinking
processes.
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Part III
- Hypotheses -
Based on the theoretical discussions in the previous part of the dissertation, I first introduce
the research model applied in the study. Thereafter, several hypotheses regarding the
relationships between the constructs I use in the research model are put forth.
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5 Research model and hypotheses
In this chapter, I first draw up the research model based on the discussion of the theoretical
constructs relevant for the research question I will try to answer. In other words, the
relationships between the variables I find important (and have chosen) are presented. Second,
hypotheses regarding the relationships between independent, dependent, and moderating
variables are proposed.
5.1 Introduction
In many situations, several communication technologies can be used for the same tasks, but
with different outcomes or effects. That is, dependent on factors like audience/message
receiver, motives of the sender, etc., one particular communication technology might be more
efficient and effective than others, although several technologies can be used to transfer the
same message. Selection of a dissemination medium most appropriate for a particular content
and situation (e.g. purpose, receiver, etc.), then, is a complex and challenging task.
The importance of a deliberate selection of communication media may be enhanced as the
media and formats available for dissemination are increasing rapidly with new technological
development. In addition, in some situations, multifaceted approaches to communication can
be required ifthe most efficient and effective information exchange is to be achieved, and this
proliferation is thus helpful in meeting the need for various communication means. It is
therefore important to investigate which media to use based on the motives and needs of the
information receiver. That is, dependent on the situation that the information receiver is in,
various elements or aspects of the interaction may be more important than others.
Many factors are important for innovative/creative problem solving. For example, Runco
(2004) speaks of personal, social, and environmental factors when discussing the development
and expression of creativity. These factors are probably not independent. The questions are,
then, if environmental factors (e.g. qualities of communication media) can encourage or
dissuade problem solving activities, and whether individuals' attitudes toward idea generation
and cognitive styles are influential in this respect.
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In this study, I focus on problem solving situations in general and innovative thinking in
particular. The objective of the study is to investigate whether (and in case how)
communication media can influence innovative thinking processes, and on this basis I have
selected three distinct affordances that are perceived as particularly relevant.
5.2 Variables
Based on the theoretical review in the previous part, the following variables are included in
the research model: First, the independent variables - "synchronicity", "parallelism", and
"identification" - are distinct affordances of communication processes. Second, the dependent
variables are manifestations of two distinct thinking processes involved in idea generation -
"divergent focus" and "convergent focus". Cognitive styles of individuals - "assimilators"
versus "explorers", and attitudes toward idea generation - "preference for ideation" and
"preference for evaluation", are moderating variables (see figure 5.1).
Cognitive style Attitudes toward idea generation
Preference for Preference for
Assimilators / Explorers ideation evaluation
Affordances
Innovative
Synchronicity
thinking
Divergent
focus
Parallelism
Convergent
focus
Identification
Figure 5.1: Research model
Information and communication technologies differ in their abilities to support affordances of
the communication process. In chapter 4, it was argued that different levels of synchronicity,
parallelism, and identification may be significant factors for group processes (gains and
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losses) in a group-based problem solving situation, which again may either enhance or reduce
the divergent and convergent focuses of the group members. As discussed in chapter 2, the
concepts of divergence and convergence refer to distinct processes necessary for successful
idea generation in group-based problem solving. In this respect, divergent thinking involves
production of ideas without evaluation, while convergent thinking involves application of
judgment and evaluation of the ideas that are produced. It was further discussed how these
cognitive processes find expression in language, and the concepts of "divergent focus" and
"convergent focus" were described as manifestations of the two thinking processes. Hence, I
expect that the affordances will have different effects on divergent focus and convergent
focus, and in this way, use of specific communication media (and different configurations)
may influence the outcome of group-based problem solving.
Even though it can be argued for a direct relationship between communication affordances
and innovative thinking as described above, individual factors are also expected to be
influential in this respect. As can be seen in figure 5.1, both the participants' cognitive styles
and their attitudes toward idea generation are depicted as moderators of the relationships
between the independent variables and the dependent variables. That is, the effects of
affordances on innovative thinking may vary depending on the individuals' cognitive styles
and attitudes, and these variables must therefore be taken into consideration. Cognitive style
refers to personal dispositions regarding information processing characteristics that affect
individuals' thinking processes. I have used the distinction between assimilative and
explorative cognitive styles as described by Kaufman (1979; 1995), which emphasizes the
difference between two strategies (rule-following and novelty-seeking, respectively) in
problem solving situations. Similarly, in research focusing on creative problem solving,
attitudes toward idea generation have also been shown to influence the outcome of the process
(e.g. Basadur et aL, 1982). I have for that reason included two attitudinal constructs
(preference for ideation and preference for evaluation) as moderators in the model. A high
preference for ideation implies mind-sets that are expected to positively influence the
divergent part of the problem solving process, and in contrast, a high preference for
evaluation implies mind-sets that are expected to be in accordance with the convergent
process of problem solving.
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In sum, various communication media possess different characteristics or qualities, and
therefore differ in their support of communication properties or affordances. The main
objective of this research is to investigate the relationships between the selected affordances
of the communication situation and divergent and convergent thinking processes. Further, the
study aims at applying concepts related to attitudes toward idea generation and cognitive
styles as moderators of the relationships between affordances facilitated by use of
communication media and innovative thinking. I will now introduce a set of hypotheses
regarding the expected relationships (effects) between the variables.
5.3 Hypotheses
In this section, I first put forth hypotheses regarding the mam effects of the selected
affordances of communication on "divergent focus" and "convergent focus". Second, I
propose hypotheses regarding the moderating effects of individual differences (attitudes
toward idea generation and cognitive styles) on the relationships between affordances and
innovative thinking processes.
5.3.1 Main effects of affordances on innovative thinking processes
Divergent thinking is by some researchers juxtaposed with "creative thinking" (see e.g. Huitt,
1998), and divergent activities in a problem solving context thus involve creativity leading to
new idea generation. Creativity is needed in order to come up with as many solutions to a
problem as possible. Then, the question is which affordances are important for divergent
thinking or ideation? The Osborn-Parnes model of creative problem solving (Parnes &
Harding, 1992) stresses four critical rules that must apply to each divergent stage in process:
withholding judgment, freewheeling, generating a quantity of ideas, and hitchhiking on the
ideas of others. It can therefore be assumed that affordances supporting these rules are likely
to positively influence a "divergent focus".
While the concept of divergence is related to creative thinking, critical thinking relates to
convergence. That is, convergence involves an assessment of the significance, importance or
quality of the various ideas that are put forth. And on this basis, a critical selection of possible
solutions to a problem is made. I will now discuss and propose hypotheses regarding
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relationships between affordances on the one side, and "divergent focus" and "convergent
focus" on the other side.
Synchronicity
As discussed in chapter 2, deferral of judgement and allowing ideas to come forth freely, no
matter how ludicrous or impractical they may seem, is critical to successful ideation or
divergence. Often we are embarrassed to come out and state these ideas simply because they
are outrageous. Hence, judging, maybe more than any other event, will shut down idea
generation. Further, the social element in idea generation is also important in this respect, and
the risk of getting negative comments may inhibit people from promoting solutions. This may
be particularly valid for extreme (radically new) ideas.
Feedback is a powerful tool for innovation processes, and it is important to emphasize the role
of immediacy of feedback (timing) as a particular collaboration characteristic in idea
generation. That is, timing of feedback is important in order to avoid a situation where
evaluation stifles innovation before it has a chance to develop. While there are many different
methodologies about how to most effectively engage in idea generating activities, one element
they have in common is that the free flow of initial ideas must occur without the interruptions
of criticisms or evaluations.
As described in chapter 4, low synchronicity enables both rehearsability and reprocessability,
which may be regarded as "evaluative or convergent activities". High synchronicity on the
other hand, does not render possible a critical examination of neither the ideas that the sender
is to put forth (rehearsability), nor the ideas or messages that an individual has received from
other participants (reprocessability) before composing a response. Thus, interaction in same-
time, although enabling interruption and immediate critical feedback, may have positive
impacts on divergence. On this basis, the following hypotheses are put forth:
HIa: Participants involved in interaction with high synchronicity have a higher "divergent
focus" than participants involved in interaction with low synchronicity, and
HIb: participants involved in interaction with low synchronicity have a higher "convergent
focus" than participants involved in interaction with high synchronicity.
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Parallelism
Parallelism refers to the number of simultaneous dialogues that can effectively take place at
the same time. According to Van de Ven et al. (1999), an increase in the number ofinitiatives
undertaken by a large number of interacting people enhances the probability of stimulating
innovation. With reference to the distinction between ideation and evaluation, one aspect that
supports the assertion put forward by Vande Ven et al. (ibid.), is that high degree of
parallelism makes it difficult to reprocess ideas that have been put forth, while at the same
time being attentive to the ongoing discussions. Hence, there is no room for a comprehensive
critical evaluation of all ideas that are proposed.
Another important aspect of parallelism regarding idea generation, which may be a
consequence of the absence of opportunities for critical evaluation as discussed above, is that
it can create an environment of interaction and discussion that facilitates hitchhiking.
However, there will not be an exponential increase in hitchhiking effects with increasing
parallelism. The reason for this is that individuals' cognitive capacities are limited, thus there
may be a problem of information overload if the number of participants exceeds a certain
limit.
Conversely, low (or absence of) parallelism will probably result in more (and critical)
rehearsability of the ideas that the participants are to suggest. In these cases, the participants
are aware of that they have the other participants' full attention when contributing their ideas,
and are thus likely to be more self-critical when communicating. However, in situations where
the participants are anonymous, this effect may be weakened (or absent). Therefore, given
that the number of participants in a problem solving situation are below the critical limit
regarding information overload mentioned in the previous paragraph, the following
hypotheses may be stated:
H2a: Participants involved in interaction with high parallelism have a higher "divergent
focus" than participants involved in interaction with low parallelism, and
H2b: participants involved in interaction with low parallelism have a higher "convergent
focus" than participants involved in interaction with high parallelism.
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Identification
Participants in joint idea generating tasks are influenced by each other. This is particularly
relevant when it comes to the participants' decisions of whether or not to contribute and
express their ideas. Most individuals are concerned about how others perceive and think of
them, and can therefore be reluctant to express unorthodox or non-conforming thoughts.
Supporting this assumption, groups using anonymous electronic meeting systems have been
found to generate more critical comments than groups using EMS where the author of each
comment was identified (Connollyet al., 1990; Jessup et al., 1990; Valacich et al., 1992a). So,
working in a group where the identities of the participants are known might inhibit a
contributor who anticipates embarrassment, hostile evaluation, conformity pressures, or other
punishments for proposing unusual ideas. In contrast, anonymity may lead to a reduction of
these mechanisms. That is, it is reasonable to believe that the fear of getting negative
comments will be lower if the interacting parties do not know the identity of each other, even
though the nature (degree/strength) of the critical comments may be higher in anonymous
environments than in identified environments (cf. research on electronic meeting systems
cited above). In other words, the barriers related to idea expression that people experience,
will be lower if the proposals can be done anonymously. This is particularly important
considering that the last ideas, the ones beyond the mental blocks and into the subconscious,
often are the highest quality ideas. In this sense, anonymity may facilitate high quality
ideative thinking and behavior. In contrast, even though the barriers for utterances of extreme
points of view (both ideative and critical) may decrease with increasing anonymity, the social
mechanisms (e.g. fear of criticism) that come to play in identified environments will result in
more self-critical thinking and behavior. Accordingly, the contributions may be more
evaluative and based on established rules. Thus:
H3a: Participants involved in interaction with low identification have a higher "divergent
focus" than participants involved in interaction with high identification, and
H3b: participants involved in interaction with high identification have a higher "convergent
focus" than participants involved in interaction with low identification.
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5.3.2 Moderating effects of attitudes and cognitive style
Individuals' attitudes toward idea generation and cognitive styles may moderate the
relationships between affordances and innovative thinking processes, and hypotheses
regarding the potential moderating effects of these individual differences are put forth in the
following sections.
Moderating effects on the role of synchronicity
As assimilators prefer to follow established rules or schemes, and explorers have a strong
need for novelty and stimulus variability (Kaufmann, 1989; Kaufmann & Martinsen, 1993),
the ability to rehearse and critically evaluate a message before sending it to others is likely to
be more important to people that are located at the "assimilative side" of the assimilation-
exploration continuum than it is for explorative individuals. And as described earlier, the
degree of synchronicity is important when evaluating the possibilities for rehearsal of ideas
before they are expressed. Low synchronicity renders possible rehearsability and
reprocessability (given that the information is stored). Consequently, assimilators may, to a
larger extent than explorers, appreciate the opportunities for rehearsing and reprocessing ideas
and comments that are present in low synchronous interaction. And therefore we may find
that the wordings of contributions from assimilators are more evaluative compared to
contributions from individuals with an explorative cognitive style. The same arguments hold
for attitudes toward idea generation as well. More specifically, as low synchronicity renders
possible evaluative activities, we may expect that low synchronous interaction is more
suitable for individuals with a high preference for evaluation than for people with a low
preference for evaluation. The following hypothesis can on this basis be put forth:
H4a: The effects of synchronicity on "convergent focus" will increase with
a) increasing assimilative cognitive styles
b) increasing preferences for evaluation
Explorative people, on the other hand, may be more satisfied with a communication process
characterized by immediate feedback. They are less concerned with accuracy, rehearsability,
and reprocessability than assimilative individuals. Their preferences for non-critical idea-
generating processes are therefore in accordance with high synchronous interaction. Likewise,
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the communication characteristics resulting from high synchronicity mentioned above also
tally with high preferences for ideation in a problem solving situation. It may therefore be
expected that manifestations of the divergent innovative thinking process become more
distinct as the individuals' preferences for ideation increase. Thus:
H4b: The effects of synchronicity on "divergent focus" will increase with
a) increasing explorative cognitive styles
b) increasing preferences for ideation
Moderating effects on the role of parallelism
Communication media that limits the communication processes to include only two persons at
a time, also pose limits on the amount of information that can be transmitted. By this, the
potential for information overload decreases, and it gives the participants better opportunities
to evaluate the information they receive. Evaluative activities like rehearsability and
reprocessability are thus higher in situations with low parallelism than in situations with high
parallelism. As described above, both assimilative cognitive styles and high preferences for
evaluation are more "in accordance with" such an interaction environment, therefore:
H5a: The effects of parallelism on "convergent focus" will increase with
a) increasing assimilative cognitive styles
b) increasing preferences for evaluation
High parallelism is (in most situations) associated with a greater amount of information that
can be simultaneously distributed to many participants compared to low (or absent)
parallelism. Consequently, individuals that are comfortable in situations where neither the
information flow nor the information "content" follow predefined structures, will be more
comfortable with highly parallel interaction than people that prefer structured interaction.
Moreover, this increase in information flow and interaction opportunities also facilitates
hitchhiking on other participants' ideas, and reduces evaluation apprehension, concentration
blocking, and air-time fragmentation. As these processes are positive for the ideative part of
idea generation, the influence of high degree of parallelism on all of these group processes is
probably more valued by a) explorative individuals than assimilative individuals, and b)
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individuals with high preferences for ideation than people with low preferences for ideation.
The results will thus be that the contributions in high parallel interaction will be more
divergent for highly explorative and "ideative" individuals. Therefore:
H5b: The effects of parallelism on "divergent focus" will increase with
a) increasing explorative cognitive styles
b) increasing preferences for ideation
Moderating effects on the role of identification
In a situation with high identification, individuals may become more self aware, and
experience more conformance pressure and evaluation apprehension than in a situation with
low identification. As stated in hypothesis H3b, this may increase the evaluative and
convergent activities of problem solving. Further, as the Assimilator-Explorer Theory posits
that assimilators are more conformist and rule bound than explorers (Martinsen, 1995),
individuals with the former cognitive style would probably be more satisfied with the effects
of high identification than individuals located at the explorative side of the cognitive style
continuum. This will probably also be the case for individuals with high preferences for
evaluation compared to individuals with low preferences for evaluation. In other words, the
effects of identification on innovative thinking processes will be strengthened by the cognitive
styles and attitudes toward idea generation that fit best with the specific thinking process.
Therefore:
H6a: The effects ofidentification on "convergent focus" will increase with
a) increasing assimilative cognitive styles
b) increasing preferences for evaluation
Above I argued that interaction with high identification tally with both assimilative cognitive
styles and high preferences for evaluation. In situations with low identification, however, the
interaction environment is more suitable for explorers and individuals with high preferences
for ideation. That is, low identification of participants in group-based problem solving can
result in situations where explorers and highly ideative people more freely can "live out" their
preferences for going off in new directions, decreasing the inhibition explorers and ideative
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individuals may experience in situations with high identification. As argued in previous
sections, cognitive style and attitudes toward idea generation are believed to strengthen the
effects of communication properties/affordances on the innovative thinking process that are
closest to the cognitive style and attitudes of the individual. For explorers and individuals that
score high on preference for ideation, I believe this to be divergent focus, therefore:
H6b: The effects of identification on "divergent focus" will increase with
a) increasing explorative cognitive styles
b) increasing preferences for ideation
5.4 Conclusion
In this part of the dissertation, I described the research model of the study. Thereafter, several
hypotheses regarding the expected relationships between the constructs in the model were
stated. First, hypotheses concerning the direct influence of affordances of communication
processes enabled by electronic media on innovative thinking processes were put forth. And
second, I posited hypotheses that focused on the attitudes toward idea generation and
cognitive styles of the individuals involved in idea generation activities as moderators of the
relationships between affordances and innovative thinking processes. I will now turn to a
description of the methodological approach that was applied in order to test the hypotheses.
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individuals may experience in situations with high identification. As argued in previous
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5.4 Conclusion
In this part of the dissertation, I described the research modelofthe study. Thereafter, several
hypotheses regarding the expected relationships between the constructs in the model were
stated. First, hypotheses concerning the direct influence of affordances of communication
processes enabled by electronic media on innovative thinking processes were put forth. And
second, I posited hypotheses that focused on the attitudes toward idea generation and
cognitive styles of the individuals involved in idea generation activities as moderators of the
relationships between affordances and innovative thinking processes. I will now turn to a
description of the methodological approach that was applied in order to test the hypotheses.
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Part IV
- Methodology and Analysis -
The purpose of the first chapter (6) in part IV is to describe the methodological foundation of
the research. That is, I first devote the attention to a discussion of methodological issues
regarding how to provide an answer to the research question, and report on the development
of measures of dependent and independent variables. Finally, the results of the empirical tests
of the hypotheses are put forth in chapter 7.
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Subjects participating in the experiments were randomly distributed into groups (with 3-5
participants) that pertain to a specific experimental condition/group. One experimental
condition consisted of several problem solving groups in which the participants were given a
task that necessitated information exchange and interaction between the members in order to
be accomplished. This communication was carried out by use ofICT. Within the experimental
conditions, the affordances were manipulated in the same manner for all groups. See figure
6.1 below for an illustration of the relationship between experimental groups and problem
solving groups.
Experimental condition
Problem
solving group
Problem solving group
Problem
solving group
Participant 1
Problem
solving group
Problem
solving group
Participant 2 Participant 3
Figure 6.1: Experimental conditions and problem solving groups
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As the objective of this study was to investigate the effects of specific affordances on
innovative thinking processes, and not on revealing differences in effects of non-mediated
versus electronically mediated interaction on these processes, I found it unnecessary to
include face-to-face (FtF) interaction as an experimental condition in the study. Further, it is
probably easier to control the situation when the interaction is mediated, meaning that it
would have been problematic to attribute potential differences found between a face-to-face
condition and electronically mediated interaction to one or several of the three affordances. It
is difficult to manipulate one specific affordance by use of information technology while at
the same time keep the levels of the other affordances the same as for FtF interaction. That is,
as the interaction is "moved" from a physical FtF situation to a virtual context, several of the
affordances will be altered, and the levels of the affordances as found in FtF situation cannot
be copied by use of information technology. I therefore decided not to use FtF interaction as
an experimental condition in this research.
On basis of these acknowledgements, one possible experimental design was to aim at
approaching the FtF levels of all non-focused affordances in each condition. That is, all
experimental conditions would be electronically mediated, and I would endeavor at
approximating the levels of affordances that are characteristic for FtF interaction, except for
the manipulated affordance. This approach would have required 4 experimental conditions. In
the first condition, communication in the groups would be accomplished by use of technology
that provided for affordances-Ievels that were close to FtF interaction. For the conditions from
2 to 4, the focus would be on specific affordances. The affordances would be manipulated
such that the level of the affordance in focus contrasted the level found in condition l, while
the levels of the other affordances were the same as in condition 1. In this way, it would have
been possible to compare the outcome on innovative thinking across these two conditions and
evaluate whether the level of one specific affordance was important for the outcome as the
levels of all other affordances were constant.
Even though the design depicted above would have given a straightforward basis for
determining the effects of each affordance, it would have required a rather large amount of
participants. I therefore decided to apply the design illustrated in figure 6.2 below, which
required 3 experimental conditions. In this approach, the scores of the non-focused variables
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within each experimental condition were used as frames of references for determining the
effects of the focused (and manipulated) variables on the dependent variables.
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3
Synchronicity Low High High
Parallelism High Low High
Identification Identified Anonymous Anonymous
Figure 6.2: Experimental design
When focusing on synchronicity, the aggregate (synchronicity-) score in conditions 2 and 3
was contrasted with the (synchronicity-) score in condition l. When focusing on parallelism,
the aggregate (parallelism-) score in conditions l and 3 was contrasted with the (parallelism-)
score in condition 2, and when the focus was on identification, the aggregate (identification-)
score in conditions 2 and 3 was contrasted with the (identification-) score in condition l.
As can be seen from figure 6.2 above, this design does not discriminate between the groups
that were to be contrasted when focusing on synchronicity and identification (group l versus
groups 2/3). Originally, the participants in condition 2 were supposed to be identified
(implying that the aggregate identification score in conditions l and 2 should be contrasted
with the identification score in condition 3), but manipulation problems revealed in two pilot
studies necessitated the design depicted above. This had consequences for the data analysis,
and is addressed in the next chapter.
6.2.1 Experiment overview
The participants took part in a group-based problem solving session, where the interaction
among the group members was based on Groove (version 2.5). General instructions regarding
use of Groove were given to the participants in plenum. In addition, a letter explaining the
task to be solved and the specific use of Groove was handed out. The letter also specified
which computer the participants should use. Prior to the problem solving session, the
computers that were used in the experiment were configured (according to the manipulation
of affordances) and numbered. That is, each computer were assigned to one of the
experimental conditions and configured based how the affordances should be manipulated.
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The configuration also included grouping of the participants (meaning that the participants of
the various "working spaces" in Groove were pre-defined), and the Groove workspaces on the
computers were thus ready to be used as cooperative tools without further configuration. The
only thing the participants had to do was to change the default machine identity with their
personal identity (except for the participants in the anonymous conditions). As the participants
were told which computer to use as they entered the room, they were randomly assigned to
the experimental conditions/groups. When the subjects were finished configuring their
computers (i.e. make the required adaptation of the Groove settings), they were told to answer
the first questionnaire (cognitive style). Thereafter, the group problem solving session started,
and after 30 minutes the participants were asked to fill out the second (attitudes toward idea
generation) and third (perceived affordances) questionnaires.
The combination of computer number and configuration was used to relate the participants'
answers on the questionnaires to the manipulation of affordances. When the questionnaires
were completed, one participant in each group was instructed to save the discussion
transcripts ofhis/her group (the instructions were included in the letter handed out prior to the
problem solving session). These transcripts were objects for content analysis aiming at
revealing the participants' divergent focus and convergent focus.
The task
Instead of selecting a task typical for creativity research, I wanted to let the participants work
on a business related problem (or rather challenge) caused by new information and
communication technology. A drawback of this was that the participants needed some basic
knowledge of the problem beforehand. However, conversations with some of the participants
immediately after the first pilot study revealed that most participants found the task (and the
session) both interesting and challenging. The task is enclosed in appendix B.
6.3 Sample
The participants needed to be relatively experienced in using basic applications (word
processing applications, web browsers, and electronic mail applications). I therefore drew a
sample from students at NHH in Bergen. This also reduced the drawback of the characteristics
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of the task pointed out above, as most students at NHH are familiar with the "Napster
problem/challenge" (see appendix B).
6.3.1 Sample size
The research design more or less necessitated (or was at least well suited for) a sequential
sampling procedure. As the problem solving sessions took place at a computer lab, a
maximum of 25 people could participate in each session. Further, given the need for
manipulation-specific instructions (tailored instructions for the participants in each condition),
it was preferable to carry out each session with homogenous experimental groups. The
computers also needed to be reconfigured before each session. It was for these reasons
necessary to split the experiment into several sessions, and a minimum of one session was
needed for each experimental group. I therefore decided to continue with sessions until
acceptable group sizes were reached. In order to conduct analysis of variance, cell sizes of 30
are regarded as a conventional rule of thumb (Sawyer & Ball, 1981). Given a medium-to-
large effect size, 30 participants per cell should lead to about 80% power (the minimum
suggested power for an ordinary study) (Cohen, 1988). However, as no studies focusing on
effects of synchronicity, parallelism and identification on divergent/convergent focus have
been conducted (as far as I know), I did not know what effect sizes to expect. Hence,
acknowledging the probability of low/moderate effects of the manipulations, a larger sample
size than 30 per group was desirable. However, for practical and financial reasons this was not
obtained.
6.4 Collaborative tools and manipulation of affordances
The experimental conditions represented the manipulations of the independent variables. The
experiment was based on Internet technology; I used specific Internet-based software for
group collaboration, which has a set of basic functions that form the basis for the interaction
between group members. The various optional components of the software (Groove) allowed
for different configurations to be used in order to test the hypotheses. That is, different levels
of support related to the affordances affect the communication characteristics, and this was
manipulated. Thus, for all experimental groups, the technology was based on the same
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"framework", with the exception of the specific configuration that was needed in order to
provide for variation in the levels of the focused affordances.
6.4.1 Basic tool kit
In general, participants in a group session using Groove as a means for interaction first create
a shared space (meaning an interface that is shared by all participants) where the interaction
takes place. Thereafter, as the Groove collaboration software is based on several optional
components, the participants can select which components or tools that will be available for
communication in their shared space. This selection is most often done by a manager. The
manager is by default the person who initiates the collaborative session. After the manager
has selected the tools to use in the session, s/he invites other people to be members of the
shared space that is created. In this experiment, I took the role of the manager (without being
active in the problem solving task) and configured the software in order to manipulate the
affordances. In other words, in order to achieve the desired effects in perceived level of
affordances, I controlled both the configuration of tools for collaboration that were used
within the groups, and the specific group compositions (assignment ofmembers to the various
groups).
In the next sections, I will first present the operational definitions of the independent
variables, and with reference to these operationalizations, I describe how the variables were
manipulated. In order to do this, the basic components or collaborative tools that were used
are discussed with the various affordances as structure.
Synchronicity
In chapter 4, synchronicity was defined as "the extent to which the participants engaged in a
group-based problem solving situation can give immediate feedback to the postings of other
group members, and receive immediate feedback on their own postings from other group
members". Based on this conceptual definition, I operationalized the variable as the time that
elapses from the messages of one participant are posted to these messages are received by
another participant.
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For problem solving groups pertaining to conditions 2 and 3, I ensured (perceived) high
synchronicity by letting the participants work online. By using the shared space in an online
condition, the contributions of one participant popped up immediately on the other
participants' computer screens. The interaction thus occurred in real time, and the
synchronicity was high.
Parallelism
Parallelism refers to the participants' opportunities to be engaged in simultaneous dialogues in
a group-based problem solving situation. In other words, the participants do not have to take
turns speaking in communication environments that support high parallelism. Low parallelism
on the other hand means that only one member of the group can speak at the same time (as is
the situation in FtF interaction). Based on this, the operational definition of parallelism I used
is as follows: Parallelism refers to the degree to which it is possible for the participants to
post their ideas and comments at the same time without interrupting others.
In the shared work space of groups in conditions 1 and 3, the level of parallelism should be
high. Implementing this characteristic means that all participants in the groups should be able
to post their contributions simultaneously without interrupting others. Off course, the
opportunity for parallel contributions did not assure actual parallel posting of ideas and
comments. However, I am interested in the participants' perceived level of affordances, and
naturally it is expected that the perceived level of parallelism is higher in situations where the
opportunity for parallelism is high. The relationship between the perceived level of
affordances and the Groove workspace tools that are available for communication were
validated in a manipulation check.
Identification
Identification was defined as "the extent to which the contributions (ideas and comments) of
the participants in a group-based problem solving situation are linked with the identities of the
contributors", and on this basis I operationalized this affordance as whether or not the
identities of the participants in a group-based problem solving situation are displayed along
with (and thus linked to) the contributions of the participants. By using this definition of
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identification, it was possible to manipulate what Valacich et al. (1992b) described as content
anonymity, but not process anonymity. As all groups were located in the same room during
the problem solving situation, there was not full process anonymity for any of the groups in
the experiment. This again influenced the latitude regarding manipulation of identification.
However, it is my opinion that content anonymity (in this situation) was more important for
the overall perception of identification by the participants, and that by manipulating this
anonymity type I would obtain sufficient variability in this variable.
In order to ensure perceived identification, the names of the contributors were displayed
together with their postings, meaning that the contributors were identified. The participants in
groups in condition 1 and 2 were instructed to create personal accounts before staring on the
problem solving task. For participants in condition 2, the identities were not displayed along
with the contributions because of the characteristics of the tools for interaction is this
condition. In contrast, all messages that were put forth by the participants in condition 1 were
coupled with the contributors' identities in the dialog box, and the identities of the participants
(both online and offline) in the shared space were also shown in a "list ofparticipants".
6.4.2 Manipulation of synchronicity
I operationalized synchronicity as the time that elapses from the messages of one participant
are posted to these messages are received by another participant. In order to clarify the
effects of synchronicity, the interaction in groups pertaining to condition 1 took place by use
of technological facilities that did not enable synchronous communication. This was
accomplished by instructing the the participants in the group to work offline (figure 6.3).
During the problem solving session, the participants logged on the shared group space every
three minutes (one session lasted for 30 minutes). These online periods were as short as
possible, only enabling the interfaces (shared work space) to be synchronized. After
synchronization, the participants would again work offline. This means that there were time
delays of maximum 3 minutes from the messages of one participant were posted to these
messages were received by the other participants, and accordingly time delays of more than 3
minutes from the messages of one participant were posted to s/he got a response to these
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messages. Thus, compared to conditions 2 and 3, the level of synchronicity in condition l was
low.
Synchronicity
Condition 1 Conditions 2 and 3
Participants worked
onlineI
Participants worked 11+--------+1
offline I ~------~
Figure 6.3: Manipulation of synchronicity
6.4.3 Manipulation ofparallelism
Based on the operational definition of parallelism stated previously, high parallelism
(conditions l and 3) was implemented as a discussion forum that allow for simultaneous
postings, while the groups in condition 2 contributed their messages in a shared text editor
(figure 6.4). It is worth notice that the collaborative software did allow for simultaneous
postings in the text editor. However, this type of interaction is neither efficient (this will be
the same as when people speak all at once in an FtF setting) nor in accordance with
established communication etiquette.
Parallelism
Conditions 1 and 3 Condition 2
Shared note
pad / text editor
Discussion
forum I
Figure 6.4: Manipulation ofparallelism
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6.4.4 Manipulation of identification
Identification was operationalized as whether or not the identities of the participants in a
group problem solving situation are displayed along with (and thus linked to) the
contributions of the participants. As illustrated in figure 6.5, the identities of the participants
in problem solving groups belonging to condition 1 were displayed together with their
contributions (input to the discussion) and their feedback to the other participants'
ideas/contributions. Contrary, for groups in conditions 2 and 3, the identities of the
participants were not displayed together with their contributions and feedback. This ensured
perceived anonymity.
I Identifiedcontributions I
Anonymous
contributions
Identification
Conditions 1 Conditions 2 and 3
I
Figure 6.5: Manipulation of identification
6.5 Measurement
The measurement scales of the moderating variables (cognitive style and attitudes toward idea
generation) have been validated in previous research. The measurement of dependent
variables (innovative thinking processes) and independent variables (communication
affordances), however, were not adopted from previous studies, and the development ofthese
measures will be described below. In addition to the independent, dependent, and moderating
variables, I also included sex, group size, and PC- and CMC literacy of the participants as
control variables in the study.
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6.5.1 Dependent variables: Innovative thinking processes
As described in chapter 2, innovative thinking processes are manifested in language, and in
order to capture the participants' divergent focus and convergent focus in the group-based
problem solving, it was thus necessary to investigate their contributions to the group work.
Content analyses of the transcripts from the various groups were therefore undertaken.
Content analysis means that a set of procedures are utilized in order to make valid inferences
from text (Weber, 1985), and researchers applying this methodology attempts to characterize
the meanings in a given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion (Kaplan,
1943 p. 230). Central in content analysis is the idea that words and parts of a text are
classified into fewer categories, which thus are presumed to have similar meanings (Weber,
1985). In order to draw valid inferences from the text, it is important that the classification
procedures applied are consistent, and with that assure high reliability of the results. In other
words, different people should code the text in the same way (ibid.). This data reduction
process is the main problem in content analysis as reliability and validity problems usually
grow out of the semantic ambiguity of words and phrases.
Acknowledging the pitfalls of using only one coder, all transcripts were analyzed and coded
by three people (independently). The coders were given an introduction to the theoretical
foundation underlying divergent focus and convergent focus (c.f. chapter 2), and were in the
first instance instructed to read the transcripts and mark the phrases and words that indicated
convergent and divergent thinking. Afterwards, they were instructed to go through their
markings and assess the highlighted sentences/words on a 5-point scale ranging from high to
low degree of divergence/convergence. Prior to the analyses, coding forms were developed.
These forms were used to create measures of divergent focus and convergent focus of each
participant in conditions 1 and 3, and aggregate measures of these dependent variables of
groups in condition 2. In this latter condition, the ideas and comments that were typed into the
notepad were not identified by machine number or name of the contributor, thus it was not
possible to create measures of divergent focus and convergent focus on an individual level in
this condition.
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The dependent variables were constructed by use of the following formulas:
DF ~ [:: J [ ~ j / N
and
where
DF = Divergent Focus
CF = Convergent Focus
n = number of coders
dg = sum of divergent gradings from all coders
eg = sum of convergent gradings from all coders
de = total number of divergent utterances identified by all coders
cc = total number of convergent utterances identified by all coders
N = total number of contributions pr. unit (group or individual)
As the number of contributions (i.e. ideas, comments, suggestions, etc.) put forth by the
participants and groups varied (partly because of the manipulations and partly because of
individual factors), this had to be accounted for when constructing the variables. By applying
the formulas depicted above, the arithmetic means of the divergent and convergent gradings
for all three coders were weighted based on the number of divergent and convergent
utterances' (as assessed by the coders) relative to the total number of contributions within
each unit of analysis (group or individual). It should be noticed that this is not the same as the
•The term "utterance" does here refer to a word, sentence or a phrase assessed as either divergent or convergent
by a coder.
60
percentage of convergent/divergent utterances of the total number of contributions as one
single contribution may (but do not have to) contain several utterances (both divergent and
convergent). That is, one comment or idea put forth by a participant may contain l) one or
several divergent utterance(s), 2) one or several convergent utterance(s), 3) both types of
utterances, or 4) it may be evaluated as neutral (meaning that it does not contain neither
divergent nor convergent utterances). Consequently, a high score on one focus-type does not
necessarily imply a low score on the other focus-type. One unit of analysis may thus have a
similar score on both divergent and convergent focus.
In sum, the variables computed (DF and CF) were based on a combination of the degree of
divergent/convergent focus (the strength of the utterances) and the frequency of
divergent/convergent utterances. DF and CF were calculated for every group in the
experiment, and for each individual in experimental conditions 1 and 3.
6.5.2 Independent variables: Affordances
There are, as far as I know, no well-validated measures of synchronicity, identification, and
parallelism. As described earlier, I focused on affordances levels as perceived by the
communication media users, and based on the understanding of the different affordances
described in chapter 4, along with the operational definitions proposed in section 6.4.1, I
developed a scale for measuring affordances perceptions (the scale is presented in appendix
C.l). In order to test this instrument and remove non-fitting items, factor analyses were
conducted in SPSS. In these analyses, rotated factors were computed by use of VARIMA.-"'{
rotation as it simplifies the interpretation offactors.
By running a factor analysis of the items related to synchronicity, 2 factors with eigenvalues
equal to or greater than 1 were extracted. Inspection of the various items and the factor
loadings indicate that the items loading on one factor concerned time-related aspects of
feedback and responses received and given, while the items loading on the other factor were
more related to the degree to which the participants could thoroughly formulate and evaluate
the contributions. I found that the former factor or variable best reflects the concept of
synchronicity (the latter factor may rather be a consequence of the first), and therefore
decided to drop the items loading on the latter factor. In addition, many of the participants had
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problems understanding the meaning of the first synchronicity-item ("the interaction with the
other group members occurred in "real time""), and needed to be explained the denotation of
this question before they could answer it. This item was therefore removed. The final
measurement model regarding synchronicity thus consists of the following items:
- I could provide immediate feedback on other group-members' contributions.
- I could get immediate feedback on my contributions.
- My response time on contributions from other participants could be very low.
- The response time of the other group participants on my contributions could be very low.
The manipulations of parallelism in the first pilot study were unsuccessful, and the measures
were most likely affected by this. Highly inconsistent results necessitated a thorough
inspection of the parallelism-items. This inspection, together with feedback from participants
in the pilot study, indicated that some changes in the parallelism measurement scale were
required. The reason for this is as follows: All tools in Groove render possible parallel
contributions of ideas and comments. However, when using some of the tools, parallel
interaction will not be natural (similar to a face-to-face situation; it is possible to speak all at
the same time, but it is not natural or good manners). I therefore slightly changed the
wordings of the parallelism-items in order to adapt the measure to this distinction. Hence, the
focus was moved from the participants' perceptions of what was possible to what the
participants perceived as both possible and natural in a given situation. I further dropped one
item as a high score on this would require the participants to violate the well established
communication etiquette of taking turns speaking. That is, even though the Groove tools
would render possible parallel or simultaneous conversations, the scores on this item would
be low given that the participants follow common communication etiquette. Two additional
items were dropped due to poor convergent and discriminant validity, ending up with the
following measurement model:
- Thoughts and ideas that popped up could be presented without interrupting other group
participants.
- Ideas and thoughts that popped up could be framed immediately without risking that we
spoke all at once.
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- It occurred that I delayed proposing thoughts and ideas that popped up because I didn't
want to interrupt other group participants (R).
Factor analysis of the items intended to measure the identification affordance came out with
one factor that accounted for approximately 77 % of the variance. Accordingly, no reasons for
making any changes in this measure were found. Reliability analyses also showed a
coefficient alpha of .92 for these items, hence the measure on this construct is sufficiently
consistent. The measurement model regarding identification thus includes the following
items:
- The other participants in the group knew which contributions that were mine.
- It was easy to know who presented an idea/comment.
- Itwas easy to relate a specific contribution to the person that proposed it.
- The contributors were generally unknown (R).
- The collaborative tool made it possible for me to present my contributions without the
other participants knowing that it was my contributions (R).
6.5.3 Moderating variables: Cognitive style and attitudes toward idea generation
In order to measure the participants' cognitive styles, I applied the instrument of the
Assimilator-Explorer theory, the A-E Inventory (Kaufinann, 1989; Kaufinann & Martinsen,
1993). There are 15 items that pertain to the assimilative cognitive style, and 15 explorer-
related items. The total inventory consists of 349 questions that should be judged for
appropriateness on a 5 point Likert-scale from "very poor description" to "very good
description". The questionnaire is included in appendix C.3.
Basadur et al. (1982) and Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985) have developed internally valid and
reliable measures of the preference for ideation (six-item scale) and tendency for premature
critical evaluation of ideas (eight-item scale) (named preference for evaluation in this study)
concepts. The two scales have been combined into one measure called the Basadur 14 Item
Ideation-Evaluation Preference Scale (Basadur et al., 1999). I slightly modified or adjusted
9 Four of the items are distractors/lie indicators (items 1, 6, 15, and 26).
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the items in this scale in order to achieve greater correspondence between the items and the
particular context, and the participants were asked to complete the questionnaire with
reference to the problem solving situation that they just had been participating in. The
questionnaire is included in appendix C.2.
6.6 Conclusion
The accomplishments of the pilot studies were successful, and the manipulations seemed to
function quite well. As the course of the main experiment were similar to the second pilot
study (the only distinction was a reduction of one synchronicity-item and two parallelism-
items), the participants involved in this study were also included in the main sample. I will
now tum to a presentation of the analysis of the results of the main experiment.
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7 Results and analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to form a basis for accurate and valid testing of the proposed
hypotheses, and report on the statistical tests that were effectuated. I first present the
descriptive statistics of the data and discuss the assumptions of the statistical analyses, and
then the tests of the hypotheses are reported.
7.1 Data description
The total sample consists of 95 subjects (including the participants in the second pilot study
carried out the 4th and 5th of March 2004), apportioned as follows: 32 subjects in condition 1,
32 subjects in condition 2, and 31 subjects in condition 3 (se table 7.1 below for a summary of
the experimental sessions). Three participants belonging to one of the groups in condition 2
had to be excluded because of incomplete transcripts of their group discussion. Descriptive
statistics for all variables in the study are presented in appendix D.l.
Table 7.1: Summary of experimental sessions
Date Number of participants and Participants Participants Participants
groups C1 (sync) C2 (para) C3 (iden)
04.03.2004 2 groups * 3 participants - 6 -
05.03.2004 1 group * 5 participants 5 - -
10.03.2004 1 group * 5 participants 5 - -
11.03.2004 2 groups * 3 participants - 6 -
11.03.2004 2 groups * 3 participants - 6
12.03.2004 2 groups * 3 participants - 6 -
15.03.2004 2 groups * 4 participants. - - 11
1 crouo * 3 participants
15.03.2004 1 group * 4 participants. 7 - -
1 group * 3 participants
30.09.2004 1 group * 4 participants. - 7 -
1 oroup * 3 participants
01.10.2004 2 groups * 3 participants - - 6
01.10.2004 2 groups * 3 participants 6 - -
4 groups * 4 participants
9 7 816.02.2005 1 group * 3 participants
1 group * 5 participants
Total 32 32 31
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7.2 Dependentvariables
As described in section 6.5.1, the dependent variables were calculated based on a combination
of the strength/degree of divergent/convergent focus and the frequency of divergent/
convergent utterances. The mean scores on divergent focus and convergent focus for all
participants were 1,45 and 3.51 respectively. For participants in condition 1, the mean scores
on divergent/convergent focus were 1.83 and 4.65 respectively. The corresponding scores for
participants in group 3 were 1.32 and 3.16. As described earlier, it was not possible to create
measures of divergent focus and convergent focus on an individual level for the participants
in condition 2 as the ideas and comments that were typed into the notepad were not identified
by machine number or name of the contributor. The group scores on divergent and convergent
focus were therefore used as "proxies" of individual performances for the participants in
condition 2. In other words, the scores on the dependent variables for the groups in this
condition were assigned each participant in the group, resulting in mean scores of 1.18
(divergent focus) and 2.62 (convergent focus). Naturally, this has drawbacks as the value of
the dependent variables for these participants to some extent are results of the performance of
the whole problem solving group in which they belonged to. This experimental condition
included at total of 10 groups and 32 participants (8 groups with 3 participants and 2 groups
with 4 participants). As one of the groups with 3 participants had to be excluded because of
incomplete transcripts, a total of 29 participants in 9 problem solving groups were given
values of divergent focus and convergent focus by applying this procedure. By giving the
members of the same groups the same values of divergent and convergent focus naturally
results in smaller variances of the variables and imposes threats to the validity of the results of
the data analysis, thus the outcome of the hypotheses testing has to be interpreted with
caution.
7.3 Moderating variables
7.3.1 Attitudes toward idea generation
In order to test the measurement model of the attitudes toward idea generation, factor analysis
applying traditional principal component analysis using VARIMAX rotation on the 14
attitude indicators was conducted (se table 7.2 below). As the instrument has been validated
and applied in previous research, a predefined two-factor solution was chosen instead of
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extraction of factors with eigenvalues equal to or greater than one. The eigenvalues of the
extracted factors are 3.18 and 1.96 respectively, accounting for approximately 36.8 % of the
variance in the items.
Table 7.2: Factor analysis - attitude indicators
Component
h2 1 2
EVAL1 (var2.1) .15 .37
EVAL2 (var2.2) .22 .38
EVAL3 (var2.5) .42 .64
EVAL4 (var2.6) .30 .51
EVAL5 (var2.7) .22 -.45
EVAL6 (var2.10) .64 .78
EVAL7 (var2.11) .52 .70
EVAL8 (var2.14) .53 .67
IDEA1 (var2.3) .32 .52
IDEA2 (var2.4) .16 -.34
IDEA3 (var2.8) .46 .68
IDEA4 (var2.9) .66 .80
IDEA5 (var2.12) .37 .60
IDEA6 (var2.13) .17 .33
% of variance extracted 36.8 22.7 14.1
According to Hair et al. (1998), factor loadings greater than +/-.50 are generally considered
practically important. Based on inspection of the communalities and factor loadings in the
table above, I removed indicators EVALl, EVAL2, IDEA2, EVALS, and IDEA6 from the
subsequent analysis. The results of a factor analysis on the remaining indicators are shown in
table 7.3 below. Eigenvalues of the extracted factors are 2.70 and 1.83 respectively.
Inspection of the table shows that the convergent validity is acceptable for most indicators;
however, one indicator (EV AL4) has a factor loading just below the significance level of .50.
The discriminant validity is satisfactory for all indicators, except for EVAL8. I chose to keep
EVAL4 (.499) in the scale as the factor loading is close to the suggested cut of level, but
EVAL8 was removed because of poor discriminant validity. Cronbach's Alpha for the
remaining evaluation indicators is then reduced from .71 to .67. All ideation indicators have
satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity, and the Cronbach's Alpha for these items is
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.65. The Alpha level does not improve by removing any of the indicators, and I therefore
decided to keep the scale as it is. Both of these Alpha levels (ideation and evaluation) are
lower than the suggested level of .70 (Nunnally, 1978), however, values down to .60 can be
deemed acceptable (Hair et al., 1998).
Table 7.3: Factor analysis - selected attitude indicators
Component
h2 1 2
EVAL3 (var2.5) .40 .59
EVAL4 (var2.6) .32 .50
EVAL6 (var2.10) .75 .86
EVAL7 (var2.11) .65 .79
EVAL8 (var2.14) .51 .59 -.41
IDEA1 (var2.3) .40 .61
IDEA3 (var2.8) .51 .71
IDEA4 (var2.9) .66 .81
IDEA5 (var2.12) .34 .57
% of variance extracted 50.2 29.9 20.3
All in all I concluded that construct validity was satisfactory and computed 2 variables for the
hypotheses testing. The index-variable for evaluation thus consisted of items EVAL3,
EVAL4, EVAL6, and EVAL7. The ideation variable consisted of items IDEAl, IDEA3,
IDEA4, and IDEAS.
7.3.2 Cognitive style
According to the AI-theory, individuals have preferences for either assimilation or exploration
when solving problems. Factor analysis on the moderator items was conducted, and a one-
factor solution was chosen over extraction of factors with eigenvalues equal to or greater than
one. The eigenvalue of the factor was 8.95, accounting for 29.83 of the variance in the items.
In line with the theory, the analysis indicates that we are dealing with a single construct
(cognitive style), and that assimilators and explorers are extreme points on a continuum.
Following the suggested cut-off level of .50 (Hair et al., 1998), I removed 12 indicators. It
should be mentioned that all but one of these indicators had factor loadings greater than .30,
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which is the minimal acceptable level according to Hair et al. (ibid.) These indicators were
nevertheless removed because of low communialities, and as only a small amount of the total
variances in these indicators were accounted for by the factor (app. 10% for factor loadings of
.30) (ibid.). Cronbach's Alpha did not suffer when removing these 12 items, as it was reduced
from .92 to .91. Factor analysis of the remaining items showed that two additional indicators
should be removed because of factor loadings below .50, ending up with a total of 16. Table
7.4 below shows the results of factor analysis of these final indicators, which has a
Cronbach's Alpha of .91.
Table 7.4: Factor analysis - cognitive style indicators
Component
h2 1
Cognitive style - item 3 .48 .69
Cognitive style - item 4 .27 .52
Cognitive style - item 8 .41 .64
Cognitive style - item 9 .50 .70
Cognitive style - item 10 .45 .66
Cognitive style - item 11 .34 .58
Cognitive style - item 12 .42 .65
Cognitive style - item 13 .63 .79
Cognitive style - item 20 .60 .77
Cognitive style - item 22 .28 .52
Cognitive style - item 24 .49 .70
Cognitive style - item 25 .32 .57
Cognitive style - item 29 .31 .56
Cognitive style - item 31 .40 .63
Cognitive style - item 33 .46 .68
Cognitive style - item 34 .36 .60
% of variance extracted 41.98
Finally, factor analysis including the final indicators of both cognitive style and attitudes
toward idea generation was conducted (see appendix D.2). This analysis indicated that two
items pertaining to cognitive style (item 4 and 31 in table 7.4 above) should be removed from
the scale because of high loadings on both the cognitive style factor and the "preference for
ideation" factor. Based on these analyses, an index of the cognitive style construct was
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created of the remaining indicators (Cronbach's Alpha = .90), which again was used as a
moderator in the hypotheses testing.
7.4 Independent variables
By conducting a factor analysis of the independent items, three factors with eigenvalues equal
to or above one (3.47, 3.18, and 1.94 respectively) were extracted, accounting for
approximately 71.6 % of the variance in the items. The analysis showed a satisfactory
discriminant and convergence validity of the constructs (table 7.5), and I created index-
variables of the items pertaining to synchronicity, parallelism and identification. Cronbach's
Alphas for the indicators were .87 (synchronicity), .77 (parallelism), and .88 (identification).
Table 7.5: Factor analysis - independent indicators
Component
h2 1 2 3
IOEN1 (var3.1) .67 .81
IOEN2 (var3.5) .72 .81
IOEN3 (var3.7) .70 .83
IOEN4 (var3.11) .72 .82
lOENS (var3.12) .71 .82
SYNC1 (var3.2) .78 .88
SYNC2 (var3.3) .82 .90
SYNC3 (var3.8) .66 .79
SYNC4 (var3.1 O) .68 .82
PARA1 (var3.4) .75 .83
PARA2 (var3.6) .71 .84
PARA3 (var3.9) .69 .83
% of variance extracted 71.6 28.9 26.5 16.2
7.4.1 Manipulation checks
As shown in table 7.6, the mean score on synchronicity for group number one was 3.38 (st.
d.=1.03), while the scores for groups two and three were 3.95 (st.d.=1.03) and 3.77
(st.d.=0.83) respectively. The hypothesis that all means are equal is rejected at the 10% level
(F=2.74, d.f.=2, p<0.10) (see table 7.6 below). For synchronicity, t-tests show that the
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difference in means between groups 1 and 2/3 is significant at the 5% level (t=2.24, d.f.=89,
p<0.05). The difference in means scores on this variable between groups 2 and 3 is not
significant (t=O.72, d.f.=58, p=0.47, n.s.).
For group number two, the mean score on parallelism was 2.97 (st.d.=0.97), and for groups 1
and 3 the corresponding mean scores were 4.25 (st.d.=0.67) and 3.94 (st.d.=1.00)
respectively. The hypothesis that all means are equal is rejected at the 1% level (F=16.41,
d.f.=2, p<O.OO) (see table 7.6 below). For parallelism, t-tests show that the difference in
means between groups 2 and 1/3 is significant at the 1% level (t=5.53, d.f.=89, p<O.OO),while
the difference between groups 1 and 3 is not significant (t=1.44, d.f.=52, p=0.16, n.s.).
For the last variable, identification, groups 2 and 3 had mean scores of 2.56 (st.d.=1.03) and
2.84 (st.d.=1.08) respectively, and group 1 had a mean score of 3.75 (st.d.=0.93). The
hypothesis that all means are equal is rejected at the 1% level (F=I1.44, d.f.=2, p<O.OO)(see
table 7.6 below). For identification, t-tests show that the difference in means between groups
2/3 and 1 is significant at the 1% level (t=4.66, d.f.=89, p<O.OO), and that the difference
between groups 3 and 2 is not significant (t=1.02, d.f.=58, p=0.31, n.s.).
Table 7.6: Analysis ofvariance - manipulations
Group Variable N Mean St. dey. F Sig.
Synchron icity 32 3.38 1.03
1 Parallelism 32 4.25 0.67 2.74 0.07
Identification 32 3.75 0.93
Synchronicity 29 3.95 1.03
2 Parallelism 29 2.97 0.97 16.41 0.00
Identification 29 2.56 1.03
Synchronicity 31 3.77 0.83
3 Parallelism 31 3.94 1.00 11.44 0.00
Identification 31 2.84 1.08
The manipulation checks reported above show that respondents in group 1 perceived the level
of synchronicity to be lower than the perceived levels of this variable in groups 2 and 3. There
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is a minor difference in means between groups 2 and 3 as well, but this difference is not
significant. In group 2 the contributions were typed directly into the shared space and thus
appeared on all members' screens immediately as they were typed. In group 3, the
contributions were completed locally on the participants' computers, and thereafter published
for the rest of the group members. This made it possible for the participants in group l to
rehearse their contributions before they were sent to the shared space. In other words,
although the technological tool kits in group 3 (discussion forum) and group 2 (shared
notepad) did provide for high synchronicity, there is a small distinction between them
regarding this affordance. However, I do not perceive this factor to represent a problem for
the manipulations.
For parallelism, the respondents in group 2 perceived the level to be significantly lower than
the corresponding levels in groups l and 3, and the difference in mean scores between these
two latter groups is not significant. And finally, the participants in group l perceived the level
of identification to be significantly higher than the corresponding levels in groups 2 and 3,
while the mean scores on identification in groups 2 and 3 are more or less equal. In sum, the
manipulations worked quite well, and are in accordance with the experimental design (figure
6.2). However, the experimental design does not discriminate between synchronicity and
identification groups, as is necessary for analysis of variance. The differences in perceptions
of the independent variables caused by the manipulations were therefore applied to create
dichotomous variables of synchronicity, parallelism, and identification. Each respondent did
in this way characterize the level of each independent variable to be low or high, and based on
these dichotomous variables, analyses of variance were conducted in order to investigate
whether affordances influence innovative thinking processes.
T-tests in order to test the differences in perceived values of the independent variables
between groups used in the analyses of variance showed that the difference in score on
synchronicity between the high/low synchronicity-groups was significant (t=-12.94, d.f=64,
p<O.OO),while the differences in scores on parallelism and identification were not significant
(t=-O.72, d.f.=89, p=0.48, n.s. and t=-0.60, d.f.=89, p=0.57, n.s., respectively). For the
high/low parallelism-groups, the difference in scores on parallelism was significant (t=-12.18,
d.f.=57, p<O.OO),and the differences in scores on synchronicity and identification were not
significant (t=-0.82, d.f.=69, p=0.41, n.s. and t=0.43, d.f.=89, p=0.66, n.s., respectively).
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Similarly, the difference in scores on identification for the anonymous/identified-groups was
significant (t=-18.15, d.f.=88, p<O.OO), but the differences in scores on synchronicity and
parallelism between these groups were not significant (t=0.71, d.f.=89, p=0.48, n.s. and
t=O.Ol, d.f.=89, p=0.99, n.s., respectively).
In case of significant correlations between dependent variables, multivariate analysis of
variance (MANGVA) should be considered instead of analysis of variance (ANGVA). Table
7.7 below presents correlations between independent variables, dependent variables, and
moderating variables. As can be seen from this table, there is a significant correlation between
divergent focus and convergent focus, and MANOV A was therefore preferred over ANGV A.
Table 7.7: Correlations - dependent, independent, and moderating variables
2 3 4 5 6 7
Independent variables
1. Synchronicity
2. Parallelism .19
3. Identification .01 -.00
Dependent variables
4. Divergent focus -.02 .30** .05
5. Convergent focus -.11 .42** .16 .24*
Moderating variables
6. Pref. for ideation -.04 .16 -.12 .12 -.20
7. Pref. for evaluation -.03 .09 .09 .01 .14 -.15
8. Assimilator_explorer -.04 -.05 .11 -.02 .01 -.06 .17
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level.
7.5 Test of MANOVA assumptions
The hypotheses formulated in chapter 5 call for examination of differences between levels of
independent variables in their effects on innovative thinking manifestations. There are three
main assumptions that should be met in order to use MANGVA; i) the data should be
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normally distributed, ii) homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and iii) independence
between subjects belonging to the different experimental conditions. The latter assumption is
met by the experimental design in which subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three
conditions and as sampling was done from different classes. The other two conditions need to
be addressed more carefully.
7.5.1 Normality
Skewness - which represents the symmetry of the distribution (the degree to which the mean
score is in the center of the distribution), and kurtosis - the degree to which the distribution is
''peaked'' of "flat", are relevant statistics for testing the normality of distribution. As can be
seen from the descriptive statistics in appendix D.l, 12 of the indicators have kurtosis values
slightly above l, and 5 indicators have skewness values above l. The dependent variables,
divergent focus and convergent focus, have kurtosis values of 3.84 and 2.28 respectively
(skewness values of 1.54 and 1.56). Still, MANOVA is fairly robust to these violations
because sample sizes are above 20 in each experimental group (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Hence, the statistics indicate that there are no noteworthy distributional problems.
7.5.2 Homogeneity a/variance
Homoscedasticity refers to the assumption that dependent variables have equal levels of
variance across the range of predictor variables (Hair et al., 1998), and Levene's test of
homogeneity was used to assess the homogeneity of variance across the experimental
conditions (se table 7.8 below).
Table 7.8: Levene's test of equality ofvariances
Variable F df1 df2 Sig.
Divergent focus 18.87 2 89 0.00
Convergent focus 16.54 2 89 0.00
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Table 7.8 shows that the assumption of equal variances across experimental groups is
violated. This is expected as the participants in experimental condition 2 were provided group
values of the dependent variables, which reduces the variances in divergent focus and
convergent focus for these participants. However, in case of roughly equal group sizes,
violation of the equality-of-variance assumption has little effect on the observed significance
levels (Norusis, 2004). Hence, as the numbers of participants in the three experimental
conditions are approximately the same, this violation has no major impacts (Hair et al., 1998)
and is thus not serious enough to prevent the use of MANOVA. Box's M test for equal
variance dispersion was also applied as more than one variable is being tested. The Box's M
test is a statistical test for the equality of the variance-covariance matrices of the dependent
variables across the groups, and the results are shown in table 7.9.
Table 7.9: Box's M test of equality of covariance matrices
Box's
114.72M
F 18.50
df1 6
df2 188537,8
Sig. 0.00
The p-value of 0.00 is significant, indicating that the null hypothesis that the observed
variance-covariance matrices are equal across the experimental groups should be rejected.
However, as for the Levens's test of equality of variance, robustness of significance tests is
expected regardless of the outcome of Box' s M test if sample sizes are equal (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2001) (i.e. ifthe largest group size divided by the smallest group size is less than l.S)
(Hair et al., 1998).
7.6 Test of hypotheses
The specific relationships between independent variables, the moderating variables, and the
dependent variables in the research model (figure 5.1) are proposed in hypotheses H1a-H6b.
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These suggest that synchronicity, parallelism, and identification influence divergent focus and
convergent focus (HIa-H3b), and that the relationships between these independent and
dependent variables are moderated by cognitive style and attitudes toward idea generation
(H4a-H6b).
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOV A) and analysis of covariance (ANCOV A) were
conducted in order to test the proposed hypotheses. First, MANOV A using the dichotomous
variables of the three affordances (independent variables) testing whether the scores on
divergent focus and convergent focus are significantly different between the groups was
conducted. Second, in order to test the potential existence of interaction effects between the
moderating variables (cognitive style and attitudes toward idea generation) and
communication media affordances hypothesized in H4a to H6b, analyses of covariance
(ANCOVA) using the metric moderator variables as covariates, and the dichotomous
communication media variables as fixed factors, were conducted. As the moderating variables
included in the hypotheses where the dependent variable is divergent focus (H4b, H5b, and
H6b) differ from the moderating variables included in the hypotheses where the dependent
variable is convergent focus (H4a, H5a, and H6a), univariate analyses of covariance were
conducted (ANCOV A was preferred over MANCOV A) in order to include only the relevant
covariates in the tests.
7.6.1 Main effects
Effects of synchronicity
Hypotheses HIa and HIb state that people involved in interaction with high synchronicity
will have a higher divergent focus than participants involved in interaction with low
synchronicity, and that people involved in interaction with low synchronicity will have a
higher convergent focus than participants involved in interaction with high synchronicity
(HIa and HIb respectively).
Multivariate analysis of variance was conducted in order to test whether the scores on
divergent focus and convergent focus were different between groups with high and low
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synchronicity. The results from the between-subjects test of hypotheses HIa and Hlb are
presented in table 7.10.
Table 7.10: Main effects of synchronicity - between subjects
Groupmeans
Variable F-value p High (n=50) Low (n=41)
Divergent focus 0.15 0.70 1.48 1.42
Convergent focus 0.92 0.34 3.37 3.68
Table 7.10 above shows that the null hypothesis that there are no differences between groups
is not rejected, thus I do not find support for Hia and Hlb.
Hypotheses H2a and H2b state that participants involved in interaction with high parallelism
have a higher divergent focus than participants involved in interaction with low parallelism,
and that participants involved in interaction with low parallelism have a higher convergent
focus than participants involved in interaction with low parallelism (H2a and H2b
respectively).
Multivariate analysis of variance was conducted in order to test whether the scores on
divergent focus and convergent focus were different between groups with high and low
parallelism. The results from the between-subjects test of hypotheses H2a and H2b are
presented in table 7.11.
Table 7.11: Main effects of parallelism - between subjects
Groupmeans
Variable F-value p High (n=50) Low (n=41)
Divergent focus 4.06 0.05 1.61 1.27
Convergent focus 11.13 0.01 3.96 2.95
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The results show that the null hypothesis that there are no differences between groups should
be rejected. The results show that individuals involved in interaction with high parallelism
have a significantly higher divergent focus than individuals involved in interaction with low
parallelism, hence providing support for hypothesis H2a. However, the results also show that
individuals involved in interaction with high parallelism have a significantly higher
convergent focus than individuals involved in interaction with low parallelism, which is
opposite to the hypothesized relationship (H2b).
Effects of identification
Hypotheses H3a and H3b state that participants involved in interaction with low identification
have a higher divergent focus than participants involved in interaction with high
identification, and that participants involved in interaction with high identification have a
higher convergent focus than participants involved in interaction with low identification (H3a
and H3b respectively). As for the tests of main effects of synchronicity and parallelism,
multivariate analysis of variance was conducted in order to check for differences between
groups with high and low identification. The results from the between-subjects test of
hypotheses H3a and H3b are presented in table 7.12.
Table 7.12: Main effects ofidentification - between subjects
Groupmeans
Variable F-value p High (n=44) LOW(n=47)
Divergent focus 0.20 0.66 1.49 1.42
Convergent focus 1.99 0.16 3.74 3.29
Table 7.12 above shows that the null hypothesis that there are no differences between groups
is not rejected, thus lending no support for H3a and H3b.
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7.6.2 Moderating effects
In section 5.3.2, hypotheses concerning the moderating effects of cognitive style and attitudes
toward idea generation on the relationships between communication affordances and
innovative thinking manifestations were proposed. The results of the tests ofthese hypotheses
are presented below.
Moderating effects on the role of synchronicity
Hypothesis H4a states that the effects of synchronicity on convergent focus will increase with
increasing assimilative cognitive styles and increasing preferences for evaluation. The results
of an ANCOV A test are presented in table 7.13 below.
Table 7.13: ANCOVA - effects of synchronicity and covariates on convergent focus
Dependent variable Source F-value p
Synchronicity 3.68 0.06
Evaluation 0.53 0.47
Convergent focus Assimilators/explorers 0.03 0.87
Synchronicity· Evaluation 3.95 0.05
Synchronlcity " Assimilators/explorers 0.23 0.63
Table 7.13 above shows that the null hypothesis that there are no differences between groups
on convergent focus independent of cognitive style can not be rejected, and hypothesis H4a(a)
must therefore be rejected at this time. However, there is a significant interaction term at the 5
% level between synchronicity and preference for evaluation, and analyses of simple effects
show that low synchronicity results in higher convergent focus for individuals with low
preferences for evaluation, while an increase in preferences for evaluation is accompanied
with an increase in convergent focus for individuals involved in high synchronous interaction
(figure 7.1). The effects of synchronicity on convergent focus seem to increase with
decreasing preference for evaluation, and this is opposite to the hypothesized moderating
effect of this covariate (H4a(b». Table 7.13 also shows that the main effect of synchronicity
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on convergent focus turns out significant at the 10 % level when cognitive style and
preference for evaluation are controlled for (estimated marginal means are 3.34 and 3.67 for
high and low synchronicity respectively).
8.0
High
synchronicity
10.0
6.0
Convergent
focus
4.0
Low
synchronicity2.0
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Preference for evaluation
Figure 7.1: Convergent focus by synchronicity-preference for evaluation interaction
H4b states that the effects of synchronicity on divergent focus will increase with increasing
explorative cognitive styles and increasing preferences for ideation. The results of an
ANCOVA test including synchronicity and covariates are presented in table 7.14 below.
Table 7.14: ANCOVA - effects of synchronicity and covariates on divergent focus
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Dependent variable Source F-value p
Synchronicity 0.96 0.33
Ideation 0.92 0.34
Divergent focus Assim i1ators/explorers 0.01 0.93
Synchronicity * Ideation 0.05 0.83
Synchronicity * Assimilators/explorers 2.30 0.13
Table 7.14 above shows that the null hypothesis that there are no differences between groups
on divergent focus independent on cognitive style and preference for ideation can not be
rejected, thus lending no support for hypothesis H4b.
Moderating effects on the role of parallelism
The first hypothesis regarding the moderating effects on the role of parallelism says that the
effects of parallelism on convergent focus will increase with increasing assimilative cognitive
styles and increasing preferences for evaluation (HSa). The results of an ANCOVA test are
presented in table 7.1Sbelow.
Table 7.1S: ANCOVA - effects ofparallelism and covariates on convergent focus
Dependent variable Source F-value p
Parallelism 0.49 0.49
Evaluation 1.22 0.27
Convergent focus Assim i1ators/explorers 0.00 0.97
Parallelism * Evaluation 1.20 0.28
Parallelism * Assimilators/explorers 0.42 0.52
Table 7.1S shows that the null hypothesis that there are no differences between groups on
convergent focus independent of preference for evaluation and cognitive style can not be
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rejected, lending no support for H5a. The table also shows that the introduction of the
covariates abates the main effect of parallelism on convergent focus.
H5b proposes that the effects of parallelism on divergent focus will increase with increasing
explorative cognitive styles and increasing preferences for ideation. The results of an
ANCOVA test including parallelism and covariates are presented in table 7.16 below.
Table 7.16: ANCOV A - effects of parallelism and covariates on divergent focus
Dependent variable Source F-value p
Parallelism 0.01 0.95
Ideation 0.85 0.36
Divergent focus Assimilators/explorers 0.07 0.78
Parallelism * Ideation 0.58 0.45
Parallelism * Assimilators/explorers 0.06 0.81
Table 7.16 shows that the null hypotheses that there are no differences between groups on
divergent focus independent of preference for ideation and cognitive style can not be rejected,
thus lending no support for hypothesis H5b. Further, the main effect of parallelism on
divergent focus reported in section 7.6.1 also turns out non-significant when the covariates are
included in the model.
Moderating effects on the role of identification
Hypothesis H6a states that the effects of identification on convergent focus will increase with
increasing assimilative cognitive styles and increasing preferences for evaluation. The results
of an ANCOVA test are presented in table 7.17 below.
Table 7.17: ANCOVA - effects ofidentification and covariates on convergent focus
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Dependent variable Source F-value p
Identification 0.37 0.55
Evaluation 3.31 0.07
Convergent focus Assimilators/explorers 0.59 0.44
Identification * Evaluation 1.74 0.19
Identification * Assimilators/explorers 1.85 0.18
Table 7.17 shows that the null hypothesis that there are no differences between groups on
convergent focus independent of preference for evaluation and cognitive style can not be
rejected, thus no support for H6a can be found.
H6b states that the effects of identification on divergent focus will increase with increasing
explorative cognitive styles and increasing preferences for ideation. The results of an
ANCOVA test are presented in table 7.18 below.
Table 7.18: ANCOV A - effects of identification and covariates on divergent focus
Dependent variable Source F-value p
Identification 1.31 0.26
Ideation 1.16 0.28
Divergent focus Assimilators/explorers 0.00 1.00
Identification * Ideation 0.00 0.97
Identification * Assimilators/explorers 3.00 0.09
Table 7.18 shows that the null hypothesis that there are no differences between groups on
divergent focus independent of preference for ideation can not be rejected, which lend no
support for H6b(b). However, there is a significant interaction term at the 10 % level between
identification and cognitive style. Analyses of simple effects show that the level of divergent
focus decreases in situations with high identification for explorers, while the level of
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divergent focus is higher in situations with high identification than in situations with low
identification for assimilators (figure 7.2). Thus, the positive effects of low identification on
divergent focus increases with increasing explorative cognitive styles, indicating a
relationship in accordance with hypothesis H6b(a).
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
Divergent
focus
High
2.0 identification
Low
1.0 identification
Explorative
Cognitive style
Assimilative
Figure 7.2: Divergent focus by identification-cognitive style interaction
7.8 Summary of results
The analyses ofmain effects of communication affordances and innovative thinking processes
showed no effects of synchronicity and identification, while high parallel interaction seemed
to lead to both higher divergent focus and convergent focus. However, the introduction of
moderating variables abated the main effects of parallelism. In contrary, the main effect of
synchronicity on convergent focus turned out significant when covariates aiming at testing the
interaction effects between synchronicity and attitudes toward idea generation and cognitive
style were introduced, lending support for hypothesis HI b. The other hypotheses regarding
main effects ofmedia affordances on innovative thinking processes (HIa, H2a, H2b, H3a, and
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H3b) have to be rejected at this point. Possible explanations of the lack of main effects are
discussed in the next chapter.
The tests of interaction effects revealed some interesting relationships. First, a significant
interaction effect between synchronicity and preference for evaluation was found, indicating
that the effects of low synchronicity of convergent focus increase with decreasing preference
for evaluation, which is opposite to the relationship proposed in H4a(b). Second, a significant
interaction effect (at the 10 % level) between identification and cognitive style on divergent
focus was found. Low identification seems to be accompanied with higher divergent focus as
the individuals move toward the explorative end of the cognitive style continuum. This is in
accordance with hypothesis H6b(a). The tests ofinteraction effects thus lend partial support to
hypothesis H6b, while hypotheses H4a, H4b, H5a, H5b, and H6a, should be rejected at this
point. I will now turn to a discussion of the findings, and elaborate in greater detail on
important factors that may explain the results of the experiment.
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Part V
- Discussion -
First in this last part of the dissertation (chapter 8), I recapitulate on the objective of the
research and the findings from the empirical work. Then I discuss the results of the
hypotheses testing. Thereafter, in chapter 9, I point to the most important limitations of the
study, and present both theoretical and practical implications that can be drawn. The last
chapter is ended with some directions for future research.
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8 Discussion
This chapter opens with a summary of the research objective, the theoretical constructs I
focused on and investigated in the experiment, and the tests of hypotheses. Thereafter, I
discuss the results and offer possible explanations of the findings.
8.1 Summary of f'mdings
In the first part of the dissertation, the research question of whether, and in case how,
electronic communication media influence individuals' innovative thinking processes was
articulated. Three media affordances important for group interaction were then identified and
selected as independent variables, and linguistic (semantic) manifestations of two distinctive
thinking processes were used as dependent variables. Six hypotheses regarding the influence
of media affordances on innovative thinking were proposed. In addition, I also discussed the
role of individuals' cognitive styles and attitudes toward idea generation as moderators of the
relationships between affordances and innovative thinking. Six hypotheses regarding the
moderating role of these variables were put forth.
In order to test the hypotheses, an experiment that involved group-based problem solving and
computer-mediated communication was designed. This was carried out as 12 experimental
sessions, where the participants (in the groups) should discuss a problem and come up with
suggestions for solutions. The media affordances were manipulated, and the participants'
cognitive styles and attitudes toward idea generation were measured. Transcripts of the group
discussions were saved and coded based on the degree and frequency of divergent/convergent
focus of the various ideas and comments that were put forth (which was used as dependent
variables).
The data was analyzed using multivariate analysis ofvariance and analysis of covariance. The
findings of the hypotheses testing are summarized in table 8.1 below. One main effect of
communication affordances on innovative thinking was found, and one of the hypotheses
regarding the moderating effects of cognitive style was also partially supported.
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Table 8.1: Summary oftests ofhypotheses
No. Independent Moderators Dependent Finding
H1a Synchronicity Divergent focus Not(hiQh) - sUDDorted
H1b Synchronicity - Convergent focus Supported*(low)
H2a Parallelism Divergent focus Not(hioh) - sUDPorted
H2b Parallelism Convergent focus Not(low) - sUDDorted
H3a Identification Divergent focus Not(low) - supported
H3b Identification Convergent focus Not(high) - suooorted
H4a
- Cognitive style NotSynchronicity (assimilative) Convergent focus
- Pref. for evaluation supported**
H4b
- Cognitive style NotSynchronicity (explorative) Divergent focus
- Pref. for ideation supported
H5a
- Cognitive style NotParallelism (assim ilative) Convergent focus
- Pref. for evaluation supported
H5b
- Cognitive style NotParallelism (explorative) Divergent focus
- Pref. for ideation supported
H6a
- Cognitive style NotIdentification (assimilative) Convergent focus
- Pref. for evaluation supported
H6b
- Cognitive style Partiallyidentification (explorative) Divergent focus
- Pref. for ideation supported***
* Significant relationship at the 10 % level.
** Significant relationship opposite to the hypothesized direction was found.
*** Significant relationship at the 10 % level.
8.2 Discussionof explanations
There are several possible explanations of the findings of both main effects and interaction
effects. In the subsequent sections I discuss possible alternative explanations of the (mainly
lack of) main effects and interaction effects respectively.
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8.2.1 Main effects
The first possible explanation behind the non-findings is naturally that communication
affordances/properties do not have any effects on innovative thinking processes, or that the
effects of communication affordances are of secondary importance compared to other
situational and individual factors like group history, social bonds between participants, degree
of physical proximity (dispersion) between the participants, etc. For example, several group
characteristics can affect both processes and outcomes of group-based problem solving, and
factors like group size, group proximity, group composition (peers or hierarchical), and group
cohesiveness (Nunamaker et al., 1991a) have been shown to have impacts on the way
individuals in groups involved with problem solving think and behave. In this study I did not
focus on group characteristics, and variables like group composition, proximity, and
cohesiveness were tried kept at the same levels for all groups by means of the experimental
design (random assignment to treatments).
Effects of synchronicity on convergent focus
Analysis of covariance showed that high synchronous interaction is accompanied by a low
convergent focus when preference for evaluation and cognitive style are at their mean levels.
The effect is at the 10 % level (p=.06) and should therefore be interpreted with caution.
However, without drawing any clear-cut conclusions regarding the impacts of high
synchronous interaction on convergent focus, the relationship found in this study indicates
that the level of convergent thinking (or at least manifestations of these thinking processes)
can be reduced by increasing the level of synchronicity in group interaction. This may have
important managerial consequences (which are addresses in the next chapter).
One plausible explanation of this relationship is that individual processes and group processes
that are theoretically linked to convergence are reduced when the level of synchronicity in
group interaction is high. That is, the abilities for reprocessability and rehearsability of the
ideas and comments put forth are reduced when immediate responses are expected and
required. Consequently, the amount (both frequency and level) of evaluative contributions is
reduced.
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The role of group size
When it comes to group size, groups consisting of 3, 4, and 5 participants were used in the
experiment. Analysis of variance indicated that groups with 5 participants had a higher
convergent focus than groups with 3 and 4 participants (F=9.68, d.f.=2, p<O.OO).However, as
the problem solving groups with 5 participants all belonged to experimental condition 1 (low
synchronous communication), this had to be accounted for. Analysis of covariance with
perceived synchronicity as a covariate indicated that group size does not have an effect on
neither divergent focus nor convergent focus when the level of synchronicity is controlled for
(F=0.99, d.f.=2, p=0.38). Nevertheless, group size may be important. Steiner (1972) argue
that an increase in this variable typically "results in accelerating increases in process losses",
and further claims that "size will eventually be reached beyond which group productivity will
decrease" (p. 95). These process losses are for example information overload, air time
fragmentation, attenuation blocking, and concentration blocking. Increases in these variables
can result in a group culture with a higher threshold for proposing non-evaluated ideas (i.e.
more critical evaluations of the ideas and comments that are put forth), and group size may
thus be important for both divergent and convergent focus.
Group size may be a critical variable when considering the effects of specific communication
affordances on manifestations of innovative thinking. That is, both synchronicity and
parallelism might affect for example air time fragmentation and production blocking;
however, it may very well be the case that these process losses are insignificant when group
sizes are small, regardless of the level of synchronicity and parallelism. In other words, the
importance of these communication affordances for innovative thinking manifestations may
come into effect only for groups with a certain number of participants (e.g. groups that have
reached the threshold that Steiner (ibid.) refers to), thus implying that the effects of
synchronicity and parallelism on for example air-time fragmentation and production blocking
will only occur when group sizes are larger than in this experiment. The consequences of this
will be that the research model has to be modified with group characteristics (e.g. group size)
as moderators of the relationships between communication affordances and innovative
thinking.
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The nature of the task
A second factor that may explain the lack of effects is the nature of the task that the
participants were given. As described in section 6.2.1, the participants were asked to discuss
the Napster-case'", and come up with suggestions for products and services that are satisfying
for both the professionals (e.g. firms in the industry and musicians) and for the private
individuals that share and download music. This kind of task-type is not very representative
for the tasks that are most often applied in research on problem solving and
creativity/innovation in groups. Usually, the tasks in this research stream are rather artificial
(from a managerial or business perspective), and designed in such a way that the scope of the
potential artifacts and solutions can be as wide as possible, which allows for highly ideative
thinking and behavior. For example, a typical task used in creativity research is the
"additional thumbs problem", where the participants are asked to generate ideas and
suggestions for products and services based on problems/challenges that would have come
into being if all people had an additional thumb on each hand from next year onwards. In
contrast to this, I used a more relevant business case, which naturally affects the rules of the
game and puts limitations on the number and nature of ideas and suggestions for products and
services regarding their appropriateness. In other words, I did not construct a setting that
encouraged highly ideative thinking and utterance of ideas, thus the nature of the ideas and
comments made in group discussions were not extremely ideative, which again did not elicit
opposing (manifestations of) evaluative thinking. Consequently, the scope of the idea
production process may have been too small for the communication affordances to have any
impacts. The question is then, if the results would have been different if I had used a "typical"
creativity task instead of the business relevant task. In such a situation, synchronicity,
parallelism, and identification might have significant effects on the innovative thinking
processes as the difference between divergence and convergence would have become larger
and more distinctive. However, the managerial relevance of any relationships detected would
in this case be reduced, and the potential relationships would thus have been interesting
mainlyon a theoretical point ofview.
10 Problems and challenges related to private (non-commercial) Internet-based sharing of music files.
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Relationships between communication affordances and group processes
A third possible explanation that needs to be considered concerns the relationships between
communication affordances and group processes discussed in chapter 4 on the one hand, and
the relationships between these processes and (manifestation of) innovative thinking
processes on the other hand. In the theoretical parts of the dissertation, it was argued for and
assumed that synchronicity, parallelism, and identification had certain effects on the group
processes, and by this having impacts on innovative thinking, without actually measuring the
group processes. In other words, the explanatory mechanisms underlying the hypotheses were
not measured directly, thus the theoretical arguments linking communication properties to
group processes may be different than expected. Similarly, the theoretical arguments linking
group processes to innovative thinking may also be different than expected. Accordingly, I
might have assumed the occurrence of specific group processes in the three experimental
conditions, whereas I should have provided measures of the participants' perceptions of the
relevant group processes. However, the relationships between communication affordances and
group processes assumed in this dissertation are agreed upon and documented by several
researchers (e.g. Nunamaker et al., 1991b), thus I do not perceive the underlying assumptions
to be controversially and able to explain the lack of support of the hypotheses.
Weak manipulations
Given that the theoretical linking of communication affordances and group processes is
coherent, a forth and more likely explanation is that the manipulations were too weak. In other
words, it is plausible that more powerful manipulations would have amplified the process
gains and process losses, which again might have influenced the thinking processes. For the
matter of synchronicity, the time intervals (i.e. the offline periods) may for example not have
been long enough in order to decrease the expectations of the participants to give immediate
responses. In order to increase the length the offline periods, however, the duration of the
whole experiment need to be longer. Such an increase would have lead to a more difficult
situation regarding manipulation of affordances. For example, it would have been difficult to
control the level of synchronicity, parallelism and identification if the group work had to be
spread over several experimental sessions (e.g. over several days). Hence, there are trade-offs
that have to be made. This is related to the weaknesses of the experimental design, and will be
addressed in the next chapter.
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Further, the differences in levels of rehearsability and reprocessability between groups with
high and low synchronicity may accordingly have been too small in order to create any
significant effects on the dependent variables. There is also a certain extent of uncertainty
associated with the manipulation of synchronicity as the participants themselves were
managing the time intervals during the experimental session and thus partly in control of the
manipulations. For the other two independent variables, the manipulations were effectuated
by pre-configuration of specific collaborative tools without requiring the participants
themselves to take any actions in order to create differences between groups. However, the
problem of weak manipulations still remains. For example, the difference in levels of
parallelism between groups may have suffered from the low number of participants in each
group, meaning that it may not have been a problem that the collaborative tool available for
sharing ideas and comments imposed limitations regarding the effectiveness of
communication involving several participants simultaneously. Likewise, the group sizes, and
the fact that all group members were located in the same room, may also have been important
to identification. That is, these factors may have caused the anonymous groups (conditions 2
and 3) to be only partially anonymous, and consequently, the difference in the levels of
identification may have been too small to create any differences in group processes (e.g. free
riding, conformance pressure, fear of negative evaluations, etc.). So, even though significant
differences in perceptions of communication affordances between the various manipulations
were found, the differences might not have been large enough to elicit the expected effects on
innovative thinking processes.
8.2.2 Interaction effects
The discussion so far has concerned the main effects of synchronicity, parallelism, and
identification on innovative thinking processes. The most plausible explanation of the
(mainly) lack of significant main effects is a combination of the nature of the experimental
task and weak treatments (including the duration of experimental session). These factors are
also valid explanations of the (mainly) lack of findings of interaction effects. However,
additional elements must be taken into consideration, and in the following I will first focus on
attitudes toward idea generation, then the role of cognitive style as a moderator between
communication affordances and innovative thinking processes is discussed.
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The role of attitudes toward idea generation
The moderating effects of preference for evaluation on the impacts of synchronicity on
convergent focus were argued for in chapter 5. It was hypothesized that low synchronous
interaction would positively influence convergent focus (Hlb), and further, that the effects of
(low) synchronicity on convergent focus would increase with increasing assimilative
cognitive styles and increasing preferences for evaluation (H4a). The analyses revealed that
increasing preferences for evaluation combined with low synchronous interaction lead to a
decrease in convergent focus, which is contrary to the expected impacts of this attitude in
interaction with low synchronicity. The opposite relationship was found for high synchronous
interaction. In this condition, an increase in preferences for evaluation leads to an increase in
convergent focus. Explanations for this finding may be found when analyzing the relationship
between synchronicity and group processes, and the perception of these processes with
reference to the participants' preferences for evaluation. In other words, (the value/level of)
this particular attitude may have lead to (or impacted on) the interpretation and valuation of
the group processes in the first instance, and then elicited behavior that correspond to the
perceptions in the second instance.
In previous sections, it was argued that the degree of synchronicity is of particular importance
in view of the opportunities for rehearsal and reprocessability of the contributions it
establishes. Further, it was also claimed that these opportunities (and processes) are more
valued by individuals with high evaluative preferences. The results showed that participants
with low preferences for evaluation have a low divergent focus in high synchronous
interaction. This is natural as the communication environment supports group processes that
correspond to behavior that are in accordance with low evaluative attitudes. Here, the
expectations of rapid (reciprocal) feedback, which impact on the degree of rehearsability and
reprocessability carried out by the participants, fit well with non-evaluative preferences. As
the participants' preferences for evaluation increases, however, so do the level of convergent
focus. This indicates that the effects of group processes effectuated by the high synchronicity
of interaction on convergent thinking, is overruled by the individuals preferences for
evaluation as these increase. It may also be the case that situations with high synchronicity,
where the ideas and comments can be put forth immediately without critical examination,
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elicit antagonistic convergent behavior for individuals with high preferences for evaluation.
We also see that the difference in convergent focus between groups with low versus high
synchronicity is greater for individuals with low preferences for evaluation than for
individuals with high preferences for evaluation. The regression lines depicted in figure 7.1
indicate that the role of individuals' preferences for evaluation regarding convergent focus is
more influential in high synchronous interaction than in low synchronous interaction.
Individuals that are inclined to low evaluative thinking and behavior in general, may be more
affected by the specific group processes that accompany high versus low synchronous
communication environments.
In sum, for highly evaluative individuals, the degree of synchronicity plays a minor role for
convergent focus. For individuals that score low on preference for evaluation, however, the
degree of synchronicity seems to represent a factor that may influence the level of convergent
focus in group discussions.
The role of cognitive style
In the theoretical sections of the dissertation, expected moderating effects of cognitive style
on the role of identification on divergent focus were argued for. It was hypothesized that low
identification would positively influence divergent focus (H3a), and that these effects would
increase with increasing explorative cognitive styles and increasing preferences for ideation
(H6b). The results of the hypotheses testing showed that the level of divergent focus decreases
with increasing explorative cognitive styles in situations with high identification, and
contrary, that divergent focus increases as the levels of explorative cognitive styles increase in
situations with low identification. It must be noted that this interaction effect is at the 10 %
level, and should therefore be interpreted as an indication rather than a confirmation of a
relationship between the variables.
The positive effects of low identification on divergent focus for explorers are in accordance
with the hypothesized relationship between these variables. Causes underlying this
relationship can probably be attributed to both communication process factors and individual
factors. More specifically, when analyzing the nature of the highly anonymous
communication environment on the one hand, and the qualities ofhighly explorative cognitive
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styles of the participants on the other hand, we find that both elements support/enhance
ideative thinking and behavior. Group processes caused by a low degree of identification
when proposing ideas and comments, like low evaluation apprehension, low fear of receiving
negative and hostile comments, low conformity pressure, etc., increase the likelihood of
achieving a high divergent focus in group interaction. These processes, again, are more
appreciated by explorers as they prefer to investigate novel solutions in problem solving. One
important factor for successful divergent (or ideative) behavior is that ideas should be
articulated as they appear without making any reflections regarding their appropriateness or
usefulness, and by this evaluate the ideas based on some presuppositions. Both theoreticians
and practicians within the field of creativity stress the importance of eluding the appliance of
evaluative frameworks when doing ideative thinking and behavior as innovative ideas often
do not fit in with already established ways of perceiving the relevant issues (i.e. the problem
that is to be solved). In other words, innovation and creativity are undisciplined, contrarian,
and iconoclastic, and are encouraged by confusion and contradiction (Negroponte, 2003).
This may explain the positive effects of low identification and explorative cognitive styles on
divergent focus in group interaction.
The opposite relationship is found in situations with high identification. Here, the level of
divergent focus is reduced as the level of explorative cognitive styles increases. This can be
explained by examining the relationship between the group processes associated with highly
identified communication and the nature of the cognitive styles, as done above. In this
situation, we find that the communication environment do not eliminate/reduce the before
mentioned group processes that fit well with explorative cognitive styles. Therefore, in
environments with high identification, the social factors may affect explorers to a larger
extent than assimilators as the social processes/factors discourage activities that participants
with explorative cognitive styles prefer to undertake in problem solving situations.
Further, when analyzing the combinatory effects of strategy preferences in problem solving
and group processes, a factor that may be able to explain why low degree of identification
positively influences a divergent focus for explorers, but has the opposite effect for
assimilators, concerns the possibilities and constraints that the participants perceive in
situations with high versus low identification. In the former situation, the participants'
preferences may be (socially) restricted, meaning that explorers are only comfortable
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performing truly ideative behavior in situations with low identification. And conversely,
assimilators may also experience social pressure to act supportive to ideas and comments that
are put forth when the other group members know their identities. Hence, the absence of
social factors like evaluation apprehension that positively influence ideative thinking and
behavior for explorers, may contribute in the opposite way for assimilators. As the
"assimilative participants" in anonymous interaction are not concerned with how other group
members perceive their behavior, the social pressure to act supportive to unorthodox ideas
that are put forth decreases. In this way, high identification may increase the ideative focus of
assimilators through group process factors.
Taking these explanations a step further, it can be argued that a two-step approach is needed
in order for the communication affordances to impact on innovative thinking processes. First,
there must be a predisposition to act in certain ways, then environmental factors (i.e. degree of
identification in interaction) may influence the effectuation of specific actions given that the
predispositions/preferences for the behavior are in place. Hence, when it comes to the degree
of divergent focus in group based problem solving, low identification of contributions may
create an atmosphere where thinking and behavior that correspond to the participants' strategy
preferences are strengthened.
The other hypotheses concerning the moderating role of cognitive style on the relationships
between communication affordances and innovative thinking processes were not supported,
and I perceive the factors that were addressed when discussing the lack of main findings to be
valid explanations for the lack of interaction effects as well. However, as the participants'
cognitive styles were measured prior to the problem solving task, the manipulations and
nature of the task as discussed in section 8.2.1 can not have resulted in a narrow appraisal of
the participants cognitive styles (i.e. low dispersion on the AÆ-continuum), as may be the
case for (the manifestations of) the innovative thinking processes. I should also notice that
there were no correlations between cognitive style, attitudes toward idea generation, and the
dependent variables, which I find rather strange. I would expect that, on a general basis,
explorers were more ideative than assimilators, and the other way around. One factor that may
account for this lack of correlations between the moderating variables concerns the
relationship between cognitive style and attitudes in general discussed in the theoretical part
of the dissertation. It was argued that cognitive style is different from attitudes as it refers to
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more profound traits of people, while attitudes are more alterable and dependent on the
situation. Further, in this experiment, I might have created a situation where there was little
room for extreme ideative and evaluative thinking and behavior (because of the nature of the
task discussed in the previous section), which again lead to a decrease in the correspondence
between the participants' general strategy preferences for problem solving (their cognitive
style), their perceptions of ideative and evaluative behavior in general (their attitudes), and
their behavior in this specific situation (manifestations of innovative thinking processes).
Finally, in addition to measures of independent variables, moderating variables, and
dependent variables, several control variables (sex, group size, and PC- and CMC literacy)
were included in the study (effects of group size are discussed in section 8.2.1). As expected,
neither significant main effects of sex and PC-and CMC literacy, nor significant interaction
effects between the experimental treatments and these control variables, were found.
8.3 Conclusion
It is not an easy task to draw any clear-cut conclusions when explaining the findings of the
study. There are probably no simple/single factors that lead to the results, but some are more
influential than others. I probably have to draw on both the experimental setting, including the
nature of the task, the manipulations, and the limited amount of time the participants were
given to discuss the problem. These factors may be able to explain the mainly lack of support
for the expected relationships between independent, dependent, and moderating variables.
However, the results also show that group processes provoked by communication affordances
(i.e. synchronicity and identification) should be given attention when explaining individuals'
innovative thinking processes in electronically mediated group-based problem solving. It can
also be inferred that cognitive style and attitudes toward idea generation are factors that have
to be taken into consideration when the effects of communication affordances on innovative
thinking processes are focused. These latter topics are also addressed in the next chapter.
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9 Implications and concluding remarks
This chapter is organized as follows: First, I present theoretical, methodological, and
managerial contributions of the study. Second, limitations associated with the experimental
design and hypotheses testing are focused. The chapter is ended with some suggestions for
future research.
9.1 Contributionsto research
In this section I address the theoretical and methodological contributions of the present
research. I first turn to the innovative thinking variables, then the focus is directed at cognitive
style and attitudes toward idea generation. Finally, the contributions related to communication
media capabilities are addressed.
9.1.1 Innovative thinking processes
Manifestations of divergent and convergent thinking processes were used as dependent
variables in this study. Divergence and convergence are important processes involved in
problem solving, and measures of manifestations of divergent and convergent thinking
processes in computer-mediated group communication were developed. These variables,
named "divergent focus" and "convergent focus", were calculated based on a combination of
the strength of the divergent/convergent utterances as assessed by expert coders on the one
hand, and the frequency of these utterances relative to the total number of contributions made
by the unit of analysis (individual!group) on the other hand.
Development of these measures provides a contribution to the research field focusing on
processes involved in creativity and innovation in groups. Dependent variables in this
research stream are often outcome measures like number and/or quality of new ideas
presented by the unit of analysis (individuals/groups). However, given that the processes of
divergence and convergence are important in order to get high scores on these
performance/outcome variables, it is crucial from both theoretical and practical points of view
to be able to measure divergent and convergent thinking processes. As individual performance
depends on cognitive, attitudinal and social factors (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Kraut, 1976;
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Basadur & Finkbeiner, 1985; Nagasundaram & Dennis, 1993; Dennis et al., 1999), measures
of attitudes toward divergence and convergence as developed by Basadur et al. (1982) and
Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985), are important and necessary in this respect, but not sufficient
in order to understand the ideative and evaluative performance of individuals involved in
group-based problem solving. More specifically, being able to measure manifestations of
innovative thinking processes is important as there may be discrepancies between attitudes
toward idea generation and actual behavior in a given situation. These inconsistencies may be
attributed to social processes involved in group interaction, and this dissertation provides a
thorough discussion of how communication affordances may influence social processes,
which again may influence the decisions of the participants regarding the number and nature
of the contributions they provide to the group work.
9.1.2 Attitudes toward idea generation
Preference for ideation and preference for evaluation, which are two attitudinal constructs
related to idea generation, were included as moderators in this study. Basadur et al. (1982;
Basadur & Finkbeiner, 1985) developed a 14-item measurement scale, where 8 items reflect
openness to divergence attitudes and 6 items reflect tendency to convergence attitudes. These
researchers use the ideation-evaluation (IE) framework when assessing the effects of ideative
training. This research applies the IE-framework in relation to manifestations of divergent and
convergent thinking processes in electronically mediated group problem solving, and shows
that individuals' attitudes toward idea generation are relevant factors when studying the
impacts of exogenous (environmental) variables on innovative thinking processes.
A business relevant task was applied in the experiment, and the attitudes were measured with
reference to this specific situation. The IE-measures were on the whole in accordance with the
results obtained by Basadur and Finkbeiner (1985) in their validation of the scale. The factor
loadings they report correspond to the findings in this study, with some minor exceptions.
That is, the items that were excluded when constructing the aggregate measures (the
dependent variables) had lower factor loadings than in the study by Basadur and Finkbeiner
(ibid.). Research that has applied the IE-scale has mainly focused on training in ideative
thinking to solve organizational problems, and has also mainly involved managers. Both
development and appliance of the framework have therefore to a large extent occurred in the
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same setting and used the same type of subjects (though managers in different cultures have
been involved in field experiments testing the IE-framework). This research thus extends the
environment and the setting in which the IE-framework has usually been applied in.
There are some issues that have to be noticed when investigating the nature of the items that
constitute the scale, however. That is, there may be factors exogenous to the individual that
are influential for the assessment of the items that constitute the constructs. In this respect, I
noticed that the scale consists of items with different points of reference regarding the focus
that the participants have to adopt. First, the scale consists of items concerning "behavioral
issues" (e.g. "I prefer that we cut of ideas when they get to ridiculous and get on with it") on
the one hand, and items which are more general and not explicitly tied to an activity (e.g. "one
new idea is worth ten old ones") on the other hand. Second, within the former category, there
are items where the subject is asked to appraise his/her own situation (an example of this
would be the item "I prefer to do some prejudgment of my ideas before I tell them to others"),
and items that refer to the subjects' perceptions of how they prefer their counterparts to act
(for example "I whish people would think about whether or not an idea is practical before
they tell it to others"). There are also some items that have the problem solving group as
reference point, for example "I think everyone should say whatever pops into their head
whenever possible". Even though it can be argued that items that focus on all of these aspects
have to be included in the scale as it makes it possible to embrace wider parts of the concepts
(preference for ideation and preference for evaluation), the distinctions can be important as
the appreciation of ideative and evaluative thinking and behavior in group-based problem
solving may vary with changing points of references. This point may be important as we may
have situations where participants do not appreciate ideative thinking and behavior
themselves, while they hold the opposite opinion when they are to consider the optimal
behavior of other group members, or vice versa. In this case, items pertaining to the same
construct would be assessed different. Analyzing the role of situational factors on the
convergent and discriminant validity of the scale (i.e. testing the measures in different
settings) is a subject for future research.
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9.1.3 Strategy preferences inproblem solving
When it comes to the second moderating variable (cognitive style) in the study, there are two
points that should be mentioned. First, the factor structure revealed when testing the cognitive
style of the participants in the experiment fit by and large with previously obtained results.
Hence, the findings support the validity of the AE-framework. However, contrary to the
measurement of attitudes toward idea generation, the participants' cognitive styles were
measured prior to the problem solving session and thus on a general basis. I have therefore not
tested the AE-framework in a particular setting (group-based problem solving by use of
CMC), and with reference to a particular problem, thus the study does not provide equally
strong support regarding validity for the AE-framework as for the IE-framework. Second, and
most importantly, I have demonstrated the usefulness of including group members' cognitive
style when assessing the effects of exogenous/situational variables (i.e. communication
affordances) on innovative thinking processes.
9.1.4 Communication media: Capabilities
The independent variables in the study were communication affordances/properties rendered
possible by capabilities/qualities of the communication media used for interaction. I focused
on synchronicity, parallelism, and identification, as these affordances were perceived as
especially important for group-based problem solving involving CMC. The reasons for
selecting synchronicity, parallelism and identification were moreover theoretically
substantiated as I addressed the importance of the relationships between these communication
affordances and process losses that may occur in group-based problem solving. I further
provided conceptual and operational definitions of the concepts, and also developed a
measurement instrument with high discriminant and convergent validity. Furthermore, all
communication affordances were successfully manipulated in this study, and by means of
experimental examination, expectations about the effects of synchronicity on convergent
focus were supported. Interaction effects between synchronicity and attitudes toward idea
generation on convergent focus, and identification and cognitive style on divergent focus,
were also found. All in all the study provides a theoretical foundation of the relationships
between communication affordances and personal factors when focusing on innovative
thinking processes in CMC-based problem solving in groups.
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9.2 Managerial implications
This research may prove useful in helping organizations and individuals better understand the
influence of situational and individual factors on creative behavior through different thinking
processes in group-based problem solving. The overall practical implication is that leaders
and group facilitators responsible for "virtual" problem solving teams must consider how the
software they use in general, and the specific configurations in special, might influence the
results of the problem solving activities. That is, the technology has to be adapted to the
objectives of the group work. As both divergent and convergent thinking processes are
important in different phases of the problem solving process, the technology used for group
interaction has to be tailored to the phase or stage in which the group currently works. The
same technological configurations should not be used in phases that require divergent versus
convergent thinking processes.
Virtual teams using a combination of telecommunications and information technologies to
accomplish an organizational task are perceived as a means of firms to realize the competitive
advantage that teamwork may represent and exploit the revolution in telecommunications and
information technology (Townsend et al., 2000). In such teams, the notion of "always online"
is often descriptive for the interaction environment they work in, and indicates that coworkers
can communicate with each other in "real time" at a continuous basis. High synchronous
interaction is thus becoming popular in business life. However, the empirical results from this
research indicate that this may not be optimal for group work in all phases of the problem
solving process. It was observed that high synchronous communication environments seemed
to result in a decrease in convergent focus, and that individuals' attitudes toward idea
generation are important in this respect. Consequently, in situations where evaluative behavior
is preferable, managers should consider using collaborative tools where the interaction does
not occur online. A certain time lag between the writing (sender) and reading (receiver) of
contributions will increase the convergent focus.
The differences in effects across measures of attitudes toward idea generation and the
participants' cognitive styles also have implications for managers. The findings indicate that
the effects of synchronicity and identification on innovation processes through manifestations
of divergent and convergent thinking are contingent on these variables. As the effects of
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synchronicity on convergent focus depend on the participants' levels of preference for
evaluation, and that the effects of identification on divergent focus differ for explorers and
assimilators, both attitudes toward idea generation and the participants' cognitive styles have
to be taken into consideration when determining what kind of technology to use for group
work.
More specifically, managers should facilitate communication environments that allow for
reprocessability and rehearsal of ideas (low synchronous interaction) when the participants
have low preferences for evaluation and when the objective of the work is of evaluative
character (i.e. in convergent phases of the problem solving process). This positive effect of
low synchronous interaction on convergent focus is not found for individuals with high
preferences for evaluation, however, which is also important for managers to notice. Further,
when divergent processes are to be accomplished, facilitators should configure
communication environments with low degrees of identification for group members with
explorative cognitive styles. And contrary, communication environments that provide for high
identification of contributors should be configured for participants with assimilative cognitive
styles, as this seems to enhance their ideative behavior (divergent focus).
Hence, the study highlights the importance of considering individuals' cognitive styles and
attitudes toward idea generation when composing groups for problem solving in
organizations. It all depends on the objectives of the group work, and whether the group
should endorse divergent or convergent thinking.
9.3 Limitationsand suggestionsfor future research
Several limitations of the research should be mentioned. First, the degree to which the
findings can be regarded as valid for other people and in other settings (i.e. external validity)
must always be given special attention when applying an experimental design. In this case, I
had to control the use of collaborative tools the participants used to discuss the problem, and
by this I restrained the participants' abilities to communicate. Consequently, the
communication may have feit unnatural for some. However, this was necessary in order to
manipulate the communication affordances in the desired way, and thus also necessary in
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order to ensure internal validity. Also, by using a business relevant problem the external
validity was increased to some extent.
Another important limitation of the study was the length of the experiment. In order to ensure
that the nature of the communication (i.e. level of communication properties) fit in with the
levels required for testing the hypotheses (in accordance with the experimental design
illustrated in figure 6.2), I had to use only one problem solving session without any breaks
assuring that the participants did not meet and discuss the problem outside the computer lab.
This would have changed the composition and levels of communication affordances, and thus
severely threatened the internal validity of the research. However, given the relatively high
complexity of the task, a longer time frame would have been desired. Future research should
therefore apply a more longitudinal design and at the same time control the communication
means during the whole experimental period. This can for example be solved by using groups
with dispersed participants. Further, use of dispersed group members would also eliminated a
threat to internal validity represented by the potential relationship between synchronicity and
(process) anonymity occurring when the participants are located in the same room. That is,
systems that enable group members to share information at the same time contributions are
made (i.e. high synchronous interaction where the messages are composed online - as for the
technological facilities used by experimental group 2) may be less anonymous than systems
where the participants themselves decide when to post the messages (i.e. the technological
facilities used by experimental group number 3). In the former situation the participants may
be able to detect contributors by seeing who is typing and who is not, while this is not the case
for groups using the latter type of technological facilities. This issue is non-existing in
dispersed groups. Also, the results obtained by using a research design where the participants
are not located in the same room would probably be of more practical importance as most
problem solving groups that communicate by use of leT are dispersed.
The measures of divergent focus and convergent focus for individuals belonging to groups in
experimental condition 2 also represent a limitation of the study. As the transcripts of the
group interactions in these groups did not render possible identification of individual
contributions, divergent focus and convergent focus could only be calculated on group levels.
Group measures were therefore used as proxies for individual performance, and the variances
in the dependent variables were thus reduced for participants in this experimental condition.
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Naturally, this represents a source of error as individual scores on the dependent variables for
approximately 1/3 of the participants in the experiment to some extent are results of the
performance of the other members of the same group.
The group sizes applied in the experiment may also have constituted a limitation. I used group
sizes of 3, 4, and 5, which are common in many CMC-based problem solving experiments.
However, larger group sizes may be necessary to more accurately measure the effects of
communication affordances in general and anonymity in particular. That is, in smaller groups
it may still be possible for the participants to identify the contributors even if the identity is
not linked to the contribution. Larger groups would thus maybe enhance the benefits and
drawbacks (process gains and process losses) of anonymous problem solving groups. This is
also the case if the participants were dispersed, and not located in the same room. Also the
likelihood of detecting effects of parallelism (if there are any) would probably be enhanced if
group sizes were larger. Analyzing the effects of communication affordances in different
sized groups is therefore a direction future research could take.
A comment should also be made regarding the manipulation of anonymity, as the majority of
the participants knew each other before the experiments may represent a limitation. This
limitation becomes even more evident as the participants were located in the same room.
Although the participants did not chose their problem solving groups themselves, the level of
familiarity may have affected the process losses (e.g. social pressure and evaluation
apprehension) .
A remark should also be made concerning the partly lack of controlover the manipulation of
synchronicity. As the participants in experimental group number one were asked to work
offline and log on the shared workspace every three minutes, assuring the desired level of
synchronicity for these problem solving groups was left to the participants. In problem
solving groups with high synchronicity (experimental groups 2 and 3) in contrast, the
participants were always working online and not given any instructions. The potential
problem associated with the low synchronicity groups can be eliminated by use software
which allows for a manager to control the duration of the shared online periods. A second
solution to the problem can be to use a longitudinal research design with dispersed groups,
and where the participants themselves can decide when to work on the problem. This would
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probably have represented a situation with a relatively low degree of synchronicity (or at least
assured for a variation in the degree of synchronicity), but the drawbacks would maybe
overshadow the advantages as it would have resulted in problems controlling the levels of
other communication affordances (e.g. parallelism). Also, increasing the length of the offline
periods would have represented a stronger manipulation of synchronicity. This would have
been problematic in this experiment as the problem solving session only lasted for 30 minutes.
However, as the findings indicate that synchronicity may be important to innovative thinking
processes, future research with more longitudinal designs should consider increasing the time
lags between online periods in order to gain more knowledge regarding the effects of this
communication property.
An important comment has to be made concerning the lack of measurement of the group
processes that were assumed to be affected by communication affordances, as discussed in the
theoretical parts of the dissertation. By providing a measure of the process losses, it would be
possible to explain more evidently the linkage between communication affordances and
innovative thinking processes, thus increasing the internal validity of the research.
Finally, by seeing the research in a wider perspective, an interesting and important issue for
future research is how the findings correspond to performance measures (i.e. the quality and
success of products and services that are developed). Further, as complete models of problem
solving activities involve ideative and evaluative thinking and behavior in several phases of
the total problem solving process, it is important to investigate the effects of communication
affordances within each phase of the process. Basadur (199Sb) found that the degree to which
a person might accept and practice ideation and evaluation depends on whether the person is
in the problem finding phase (stage I), the problem solution phase (stage II), or the solution
implementation phase (stage III). So, the question is then if (an in case how) synchronicity,
parallelism, and identification (and other communication affordances) influence divergent and
convergent thinking processes in these stages.
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- Appendices -
A Process gains and process losses in group work
Process gains
More information A group as a whole has more information than anyone member
Synergy A member uses information in a way that the original holder did not,
because that member has different information or skills
More objective evaluation Groups are better at catching errors than are the individuals who proposed
ideas
Stimulation Working as part of a group may stimulate and encourage individuals to
perform better
Learning Members may learn from and imitate more skilled members to improve
p_erformance
Process losses
Air time fragmentation The grollp must partition available sQ_eakingtime among members
Attenuation blocking Attenuation blocking occurs when member who are prevented from
contributing comments as they occur, forget or suppress them later in the
meeting, because they seem less original, relevant or important.
Concentration blocking Fewer comments are made because members concentrate on remembering
comments (rather than thinking on new ones) until they can contribute
them.
Attention blocking New comments are not generated because members must constantly listen
to others speak and cannot pause to think.
Failure to remember Members lack focus on communication, missing or forgetting the
contributions of others.
Conformance pressure Members are reluctant to criticize the comments of others due to politeness
or fear of reprisals.
Evaluation apprehension Fear of negative evaluation causes members to withhold ideas and
comments.
Free riding Members rely on others to accomplish goals, due to cognitive loafing, the
need to compete for air time, or because they perceive their input to be
unneeded.
Cognitive inertia Discussion moves along one train of thought without deviating, because
group members refrain from contributing comments that are not directly
related to the current discussion.
Socializing Non-task discussion reduces task performance, although some socializing
is usually necessary for effective functioning.
Domination Some group member(s) exercise undue influence or monopolize the
_grouQ's time in an unproductive manner.
Information overload Information is presented faster than it can be processed.
Coordination problems Difficulty integrating members' contributions because the group does not
have an appropriate strategy, which can lead to dysfunctional cycling or
incomplete discussions resulting in premature decisions.
Incomplete use of information Incomplete access to and use of information necessary for successful task
completion.
Incomplete task analysis Incomplete analysis and understanding of task resulting in superficial
discussion.
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B Problem solving task
(Translated from Norwegian)
The website. Nåpster.com allowed their
flIes .being cqPled·to Nåpster's server (åll' files were loc,ateQå
charging anything for the service. It was in other .. y' .
flies, and the existing copyright was thus i:lvoided. In their
million users, but the (free) service has been offline since July 2001. The
joined forces and went to court based on inventors' copyrights, and enforced Napster to pullout
the plug. Now Napster has resumed the activities as a (corporate contrOlled) payment service. The
CD-software producer Roxio, who took over the legal right~ to use the Napster-brand in Nqvember
200~, ha~ re-launched Napster as.a. paymentservic:e.
Problem: The st2lnc:e ()ft:he, pelro; a,ndfU1tur'e (:hatlle,nges
The record business: The problem that the record
may lead to a reduction in record sales. According to rn<' nil ..'
downloaded music from Napster instead of buying
between the record business and the originator of Napster.no, the
WO'UIOInave obtained the music legally if the
mentioned above, it was asserted that because of the lnlternelti\:ne···el<tent
much more substantial than private copying in individuals' homes. HOWever, thiE!dlow,nlcladinclttiåt
individuals do, have no other consequences for the copyright holder~ thqn if. it. a pnysical
was copied in a private home.
What happens? When Napster now has changed its bustness model, installed. filter, and started
charging for their services, many people eXPect that mostjndividqats will Jqøk .for other ways of
getting free music. Napster was the first flle-sharing network of significance, b.ut there are lots of
other file-sharing services on the Internet today (i.e. Kazaa and Gnutella). some of these services
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are built on the same technological principles as Napster, but there are also others that use
completely different techniques. So, apparently this seems like an insurmountable problem for the
record business.
employees in the R&D department of a record company, and your task is to
services that solve this problem in a way that is satisfying
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C Questionnaires
C.l Originalmeasurement scale - affordances
l) The interaction with the other group members occurred in "real time".
2) All participants in the group could present/frame their contributions simultaneously.
3) The other participants in the group knew which contributions that were mine.
4) I could provide immediate feedback on other group-members' contributions.
5) I had to delay framing my contributions until the other group participants had
framed their contributions.
6) I could get immediate feedback on my contributions.
7) Thoughts and ideas that popped up could be proposed immediately without
interrupting other group participants.
8) It was easy to know who presented an idea/comment.
9) It was plenty of time to reflect on and formulate my contributions before I
presented them to the other group participants.
10) I often perceived that we spoke all at once.
Il) I had plenty of time for evaluation of other group participants' contributions before
I had to provide feedback.
12) It was easy to relate a specific contribution to the person that proposed it.
13) I was often interrupted when I presented my contributions.
14) My response time on contributions from other group participants could be very low.
15) It often occurred that I didn't propose thought and ideas that popped up because I
didn't wanted to interrupt other group participants.
16) The response time of the other group participants on my contributions could be
very low.
17) The contributors were generally unknown.
18) The collaborative tool made it possible for me to present my contributions without
the other participants knowing that it was my contributions.
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e.2 Attitudes toward idea generation
Nedenfor er det listet opp 14 utsagn. Kryss av for det svaralternativet (for hvert utsagn) som
best beskriver din oppfatning/holdning under selve problemløsningsprosessen.
Svært Svært
uenig enig
--iYJeg-fi)retrekker r-evaluere-ilifue-ideer-førTeg-iegger--dem-fi.eni--foride------------------
1 2 3 4 5
andre i gruppen.
2) Jeg foretrekker at vi dropper ideer når de blir for tåpelige og fortsetter
med problemløsningsprosessen. 2 3 4 5
--3)--Jeg--mener--irt-{åli(--bør--pres-e-ntere-sarntiige--ideer--soili--de-hirr-for(fCen-----------------------------------
aldri vet om en tilsynelatende vill ide viser seg å være den beste. 2 3 4 5
4) En ny ide er like mye verdt som ti gamle ideer. 1 2 3 4 5
5) Kvalitet er mye mer viktig enn kvantitet for utvikling av ideer. 2 3 4 5
6) En gruppe må være fokusert og på rett spor for å utvikle ideer som det
er verdt å arbeide videre med. 12345
7) Mye tid kan kastes bort på ville ideer. 2 3 4 5
8) Jeg mener at alle bør si det som faller dem inn til enhver tid. 1 2 3 4 5
9) Jeg liker å høre på andres ville ideer ettersom den sprøeste ideen ofte
leder frem til den beste løsningen, 2 3 4 5
-----------------------_ .._--------------.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10) Vurdering og bedømmelse er nødvendig i idegenereringsprosessen
for å forsikre seg om at bare ideer av høy kvalitet utvikles. 12345
11) En må være i stand til å oppdage og eliminere ville ideer under
idegenereringsprosessen. 2 3 4 5
12) Jeg mener at alle ideer skal bli gitt like mye tid og evalueres med et
åpent sinn uansett hvor tåpelige de ser ut til å være. 2 3 4 5
13) Den beste måten å generere nye ideer på er å høre på andre og henge
seg på/bygge videre på ideene som legges frem. 2 3 4 5
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14) Jeg skulle ønske at folk kunne vurdere hvorvidt en ide var "liv laga"
før de presenterte den for andre folk.
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C.3 Cognitivestyle
I større grad Dllkemll« 19l1iom pl. I tillegg
foretrekker folk ofte ulike typer _, oppgaver
eller situujoD ... Nir du Dl skal svare pl spørs-
mAleDeUDdu, prøv l tenke deg bvordan du pleier
19l frem Dir dU 1_ problemer, en.... del er i
fotblDdeJse med skole, ubeld eUer anDel.VurdB
opi bvilke typer situasjoner du Uker best Du
skal aJtsl voidae om b_ av _lagene nedenfor
INSTRUKSJON MBSTTYPISK elJerTIL VANUG beskriver dOD
mlte dDgir frem pl i problemløanløg, eller bvllke
Nir vi ubeIdC< med l Jøoe problemer, typer silUujoaer du vanli&vIs Ilker beat. Sett et
ODIeDdet er isrbeid, utdanoløg eller I Iayu pl prikken som slir I den kolODDODsom
friDden. hor vi alle ulike mlter l gl pauer besI for deg, men aen Iayul kolODDODUDder
frem pl. Noen bar en leDdens til l "Nøy1l'al" bare bvIs du føler du ml Du skalaette e
bolde aeg tileD _I mite, andre Iayu for bvert u!Sap, og besvare alle spønmllene.IL".,.------------:---'
holder .. g mest til en lIDIICIl mlte, og Det flon .. logen "gode" eller "dArnge" svar. Dette ~=..Stemmer Stemmer ~=er
noen kombloerer eller vadera har logenting med IotelligeDJ eller evner l gjøre. Dirng Dirllg NøyII1II Godl Godl
Alder _
Navo
KjØDn _
Yrke
UWumiog _
J. Jeg blir aldri ølal Dir jeg øtlr fast
l. Jeg foretrekker delaljoarbeldu som krever god orden
3. Jeg foretrekker situujo ... bvor ODml holde aeg til del som gjelder og gir
4. Jeg Ilker beat l arbeide utea l ba eD pl forbind faøtsøll pJan
S. Jeg prøver meg ofte Iiom uleD 'plBDlegge systematisk
6. Jeg er aIlDd ærlig Dir jeg skal avgi etIvar
7. Jeg foretrekker l holde meg til duljeg kan godl
8. Jeg prøver oftesll fIDDe nye løsDingsmetoder Dir jeg 1_ problemer
9. Jeg foretrekker l arbeide uleD l ba klare retoiogaJlnjer l holde meg til
10. Jeg Ilker godl situujoner bvor det er Dødveodig' bryte med sksepterle oppfalllillger
11. Jeg foretrekker l UDDS'større forandringer
12. Jeg kommer besl til mio rett i situasjoner som er ordeede DSoverølklllge
13. Jeg foretrekker situujoner bvor en ml arbeide etter bestemte regler
14. Jeg vil beist fIODeul av tiDgpl egODblod Dir jeg skall_ DOe Dytt
IS. Del bar aldri hendl a! jeg bor gjott større tsbber Dir jeg tøser problemer
16. Jeg foretrekker l plBDlegge og strukturere del jog skal gjøre
17. Jeg egner meg beat til arbeid som krever systematikk og nøyaktighet
18. Jeg bar oftesl en lekende og Dyøgjerriø ionslilHDg i ubeidet
19. Jeg foretrekker l improvisere I forhold iiimioe gjøremll
20. Jeg foretrekker arbeid med faste rutiner
21. Jog ap'UdIer av Ideer Dir jeg 1_ problemer
22. Jeg Ilker besI situasjoner bvor en ml gl pltverø av etablerte Dormer
23. Jeg Ilker beat ,arbeide med ling jog ikke kjenner al godt fra før
24. Jeg foretrekker l ba klare retDiDgaJlnjer l bolde meg till _et
25. leg vil bola! ha syøtemaliøk veUedoløg Dir jeg skall...., Doe Dytt
.1 26. Det bor aldri bendt a! jeg bor juksel
j 27. Jeg er utpreget DØyaktig og oppgaveorieDtert i ubeidet
si 28. Jeg Ilker situasjoner bvor en ml aktiVI søke DYkUDnskap
~ 29.1eg holder meg stort sett til økaepterte oppfatningerg--~--~----~~~~~------------------------------
~ __30_._Je_g_k_ommerb s__ l_tIl__m_ID_ret__l_i_u_overø~_lli_·g_e_å_tua_~_ODer _
~ 3l.1eg foretrekker , holde meg til ODfulBall plan Dir jeg arbeider eUer løser problemer~----~----------~----~----~--------~------------------------------32. Jeg kan forandre mu oppfaIDlogerlideer øeJvom situasjonen ikke krever del
~O 33. leg JXØveroftesll bruko velJXØvde løsningsmetoder Dir jeg 1_ problemer
34. log Ilker beslA utforske DVlllerreDg
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C.4 Affordances/Communication properties
Nedenfor er det listet opp 12 utsagn. Ta utgangspunkt i problemløsningsprosessen du
akkurat har vært gjennom, og kryss av for det svaralternativet du synes passer best.
(I utsagnene nedenfor refererer begrepet ''bidrag'' til alle ideer, innspill, kommentarer, etc.
som du eller de andre la frem under problemløsningsprosessen.)
1) De andre deltakerne i gruppen visste hvilke bid1"l~gs()lll var mine
2) Jeg kunne gi umiddelbar tilbakemelding på andres bidrag
3) Jeg kunne få umiddelbar tilbakemelding på mine bidrag
4) Tanker og ideer som dukket opp kunne legges frem til enhver tid uten
å avbryte andre
5) Det var enkelt å vite hvem som la frem et bidrag
6) Tanker og ideer som dukket opp kunne presenteres når som helst uten
å risikere at vi "snakket i munnen på hverandre".
7) Et bidrag kunne enkelt knyttes til personen som la det frem
8) Jeg kunne gi rask respons på bidrag fra andre i gruppen
9) Det hendte at jeg ventet med å legge frem tanker og ideer som dukket
opp fordi jeg ikke ville avbryte andre
10) De andre i gruppen kunne gi rask respons på mine bidrag
11) "Bidragsyterne" var som regel ukjente
Svært
uenig
Svært
enig
1 345
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 345
I 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
at de andre i gruppen visste at det var mine bidrag 1 2 345
Hvilken maskin brukte du? D(Maskinnr.)
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Til slutt noen utsagn/spørsmål som ikke er knyttet til selve problemløsningsprosessen:
Svært
uenig
Svært
enig
Jeg er en erfaren PC-bruker 1 2 3 4 5
Jeg benytt;--rrieg of'te----;velektrohlske -kommwrlkasJonsf()rmer (fur
eksempel e-post) 1 2 3 4 5
Jeg bruker ofte Groove eller lignende programvare (for eksempel MSN
Messenger) 12345
Kjønn
Kvinne MannDD
Epost-adresse: 1..::1 ===========@===========.J
Takk for hjelpen!
129
D Statistics
D.1 Descriptivestatistics
Std.
Skewness Kurtosis
N Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Std. Std.Statistic Error Statistic Error
Assi_exp1 91 1 5 3,44 ,968 -,688 ,253 -,166 ,500
Assi_exp2 91 1 5 3,42 ,817 -,790 ,253 ,455 ,500
Assi_exp3 91 1 5 3,58 ,857 -1,344 ,253 ,979 ,500
Assi_exp4 92 1 5 2,86 1,044 -,007 ,251 -1,157 ,498
Assi_exp5 91 1 5 3,46 1,014 -,318 ,253 -,866 ,500
Assi_exp6 92 1 5 2,99 1,000 -,180 ,251 -,774 ,498
Assi_exp7 92 1 5 3,26 1,047 -,428 ,251 -,850 ,498
Assi_exp8 91 1 5 2,95 ,970 ,037 ,253 -,849 ,500
Assi_exp9 92 1 5 2,63 ,980 ,377 ,251 -,949 ,498
Assi_exp10 92 1 5 3,47 1,010 -,399 ,251 -,586 ,498
Assi_exp11 92 1 5 2,97 1,063 ,122 ,251 -1,155 ,498
Assi_exp12 92 1 5 2,47 1,063 ,311 ,251 -,959 ,498
Assi_exp13 92 2 5 3,92 ,788 -,691 ,251 ,492 ,498
Assi_exp14 91 1 5 3,23 ,978 -,046 ,253 -,994 ,500
Assi_exp15 92 1 4 2,43 ,843 ,379 ,251 -,438 ,498
Assi_exp16 92 1 5 2,88 1,015 -,013 ,251 -1,082 ,498
Assi_exp17 92 1 5 2,79 1,075 ,044 ,251 -,971 ,498
Assi_exp18 92 1 5 2,78 ,900 ,262 ,251 -,527 ,498
IAssi_exp19 92 2 5 3,25 ,860 -,086 ,251 -,946 ,498
Assi_exp20 91 1 5 3,14 ,926 -,463 ,253 -,904 ,500
Assi_exp21 92 1 5 3,39 ,901 -,772 ,251 -,315 ,498
Assi_exp22 92 1 5 3,50 1,104 -,450 ,251 -,752 ,498
Assi_exp23 92 1 5 3,52 1,032 -,458 ,251 -,843 ,498
Assi_exp24 91 1 4 2,25 ,889 ,639 ,253 -,191 ,500
Assi_exp25 92 1 5 3,16 ,929 -,586 ,251 -,649 ,498
Assi_exp26 92 1 5 3,18 ,971 -,235 ,251 -1,025 ,498
Assi_exp27 91 2 5 3,51 ,848 -,744 ,253 -,543 ,500
Assi_exp28 92 2 5 3,80 ,650 -1,010 ,251 1,736 ,498
Assi_exp29 92 2 5 3,51 ,777 -,467 ,251 -,319 ,498
Assi_exp30 92 1 4 2,71 ,884 -,067 ,251 -,778 ,498
EVAL1 92 1 5 3,21 1,263 -,166 ,251 -1,087 ,498
EVAL2 92 1 5 3,54 1,113 -,624 ,251 -,331 ,498
IDEA1 92 2 5 4,29 ,833 -1,068 ,251 ,566 ,498
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IDEA2 92 1 5 3,60 1,090 -,387 ,251 -,574 ,498
EVAL3 91 1 5 2,87 1,204 ,142 ,253 -,943 ,500
EVAL4 92 1 5 3,52 1,094 -,700 ,251 -,256 ,498
EVAL5 92 1 5 3,15 1,167 -,133 ,251 -,971 ,498
IDEA3 92 1 5 3,20 1,170 -,181 ,251 -,922 ,498
IDEA4 92 1 5 3,49 ,966 -,454 ,251 -,314 ,498
EVAL6 92 1 5 3,15 1,213 -,299 ,251 -,876 ,498
EVAL7 91 1 5 3,04 1,273 -,216 ,253 -1,116 ,500
IDEAS 92 1 5 2,92 1,251 ,112 ,251 -,975 ,498
IDEA6 92 1 5 3,67 1,080 -,863 ,251 ,248 ,498
EVAL8 92 1 5 2,16 ,964 ,492 ,251 -,330 ,498
IDEN1 89 1 5 3,30 1,228 -,228 ,255 -,846 ,506
SYNC1 91 1 5 3,66 1,231 -,596 ,253 -,739 ,500
SYNC2 91 1 5 3,65 1,205 -,611 ,253 -,631 ,500
PARA1 91 1 5 3,96 1,084 -,980 ,253 ,312 ,500
IDEN2 91 1 5 3,00 1,506 ,040 ,253 -1,521 ,500
PARA2 91 1 5 3,77 1,221 -,780 ,253 -,449 ,500
IDEN3 91 1 5 2,98 1,406 ,113 ,253 -1,426 ,500
SYNC3 91 1 5 3,75 1,151 -,829 ,253 -,078 ,500
PARA3 91 1 5 3,48 1,393 -,469 ,253 -1,155 ,500
SYNC4 91 1 5 3,73 1,055 -,819 ,253 ,277 ,500
IDEN4 91 1 5 2,92 1,376 ,141 ,253 -1,252 ,500
IDE NS 90 1 5 3,12 1,421 -,028 ,254 -1,404 ,503
Divergent
92 ,00 4,84 1,4549 ,81066 1,541 ,251 3,842 ,498focus
Convergent 92 1,59 9,02 3,5061 1,50984 1,555 ,251 2,282 ,498focus
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D.2 Factor loadings, moderating variables
Component
h2 1 2 3
Cognitive style - item 3 .55 .68
Cognitive style - item 4 .38 .53 .32
Cognitive style - item 8 .46 .66
Cognitive style - item 9 .52 .70
Cognitive style - item 10 .51 .67
Cognitive style - item 11 .34 .58
Cognitive style - item 12 .50 .62
Cognitive style - item 13 .64 .79
Cognitive style - item 20 .64 .79
Cognitive style - item 22 .40 .56
Cognitive style - item 24 .52 .70
Cognitive style - item 29 .36 .58
Cognitive style - item 31 .58 .61 .42
Cognitive style - item 33 .46 .66
Cognitive style - item 34 .44 .63
EVAL3 (var 2.5) .37 .56
EVAL4 (var 2.6) .34 .50
EVAL6 (var 2.10) .79 .89
EVAL7 (var 2.11) .66 .80
IDEA1 (var 2.3) .46 .68
IDEA3 (var 2.8) .44 .65
IDEA4 (var 2.9) .50 .70
IDEAS (var 2.12) .39 .60
% of variance extracted 48.7 28.6 11.2 8.9
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